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The reader of Dr. Stirling's article will please note carefully the following corrections made in the author's revision of the proof sheets:—

Page 49, line 3 from bottom, for three read six  
 " 50 " 6 " " the " my  
 " 51 " 9 " top " as far " so far  
 " " 12 " " " then " then  
 " 53 " 11 " " of A. B. C. D.  
 read A B C D

Page 53, line 11 from bottom, for more read even more

Page 55, line 20 from bottom, for be a read be at once a

Page 55, line 10 from bottom, for own read one.  
 " 56 " 6 " " " the denial read denial

Page 57, line 34 from bottom, for expressions read expression

Page 57, line 10 from bottom, for objects read object

Page 58, line 16 from bottom, for should read should ever

Page 58, line 11 from bottom, for the read Kant's

Page 59, line 27 from bottom, for should read should now

Page 59, line 6 from top, for topics read topic  
 " " 30 " " " in " is  
 " 60 " 2 " " " had " had  
 expressly

Page 60, line 27 from top, for we read we now  
 " 61 " 22 " bottom " strained read denied

Page 61, line 14 from bottom, for accessory read accessory

Page 62, line 32 from bottom, for objectivity. read objectivity?

Page 63, lines 14, 15 from top, for the part by part read the, part by part,

Page 64, line 34 from top, for those read these.  
 " " 34 " bottom " for " for to him

Page 65, line 39 from bottom, for also read , also,

Page 65, line 29 from bottom, for series read sequence

Page 65, line 16 from top, for objectivity read objectivity is

Page 66, line 23 from bottom, for ship-series read ship-sequence

Page 66, line 9 from bottom, for with read to  
 " 67 " 39 " " " production  
 read the production

Page 67, line 39 from bottom, also read " of a judgment of objective"

Page 67, lines 32, 27 from bottom, for Herr read the Herr

Page 67, line 25 from bottom, for all read all  
 " " 25 " " " not " not

Page 68, line 15 from bottom, for this proof read the proof

Page 68; line 14 from bottom, for would read could

Page 69, line 36 from bottom, for subjectively read only subjectively

Page 71, line 31 from bottom, for Caird's read Caird's doing so

Page 71, line 17 from bottom, for all read all  
 " " 4 " " " generally read genetically

Page 71, line 7 from top, for alway read always  
 " 72, " 26 " " " time; " time—  
 " 72, " 14 " bottom for nonsense read obvious nonsense

Page 72, line 6, from bottom, for could read may

Page 73, line 35 from bottom, for the universe read this universe

Page 73, line 11 from bottom, for on read on the  
 " 73, " 33 " top, for causality. The read causality—the

Page 74, line 28 from top, for time; read time,  
 " 74, " 41 " " " Meta., 994, a, 221 read Meta. 994 a 22

Page 74, line 13 from bottom for Aphrodisensis read Aphrodisiensis

Page 75, line 6 from top, for 1023, b. 5 read 1023 b 5.

Page 77, line 4 from top, for proper read proper  
 " 77, " 27 " " " , whose " whose  
 " 79, " 25 " bottom, for actual read absolute

Page 80, line 27 from top, for of read of  
 " 81, " 9 " bottom, for a cause read a cause

Page 82, line 25 from bottom, for and read and the

Page 88, line 2 from top, for There read Here  
 " 89, " 18 " bottom, for consciousness read self-consciousness

Page 90, line 34 from bottom, for expand read expand

Page 93, line 5 from bottom, for surely read surely, too

Page 97, line 22 from bottom, for him read himself

Page 98, line 42 from bottom, for third read fourth

Page 100, line 16 from top, for mind; read mind; he has not actual events before his mind;

Page 102, line 31 from bottom, for succession read extension

Page 103, line 16 from top, for by the by read by the bye

Page 105, line 9 from bottom, for obligation read obligations

or design of God in and through us, is that this marvellous means should result in *real* thought, in thought expressed in loving act, which it is competent to do at once and in all. God will not recognize Himself in our floating Universes, our “systems of thought,” our philosophies—all these He regards kindly, perhaps, though smilingly, as enlargement of our means, if indeed they are capable of inspiring one good deed—but it is in Goodness alone that the Divine sees itself fully expressed; that is what makes of Man God’s Providence here, and seals him with the immortal promise. For a loving deed—that is verily, and alone, a Divine thought, concrete, complete, expressed—an Act.

## PROFESSOR CAIRD ON KANT.

BY J. HUTCHISON STIRLING.

Before proceeding to the second of my objections in allusion, it would throw light, and assist understanding, did I refer to Mr. Caird’s views on this, the most important question in the entire Criticism of Kant; for to mistake causality is to mistake the system.<sup>1</sup>

It will be obvious to every one whose opinion is relevant, that Mr. Caird’s views on causality must be sought where Mr. Caird treats causality, and that it is only wilfully vexatious to get up a hue and cry against what a man truly finds there, or, with an air of indignation, point to an elsewhere that exists not, or is inapplicable, or that is simply hoped to be taken on trust. To every one so qualified, it will also be equally obvious that what a man finds there, and truly finds

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<sup>1</sup> In reference to this “allusion,” I have to explain that Mr. Caird’s reply, in this JOURNAL, to certain remarks of mine in my Kant-Schopenhauer article, found me busy with preparation of a continuation to that article. Into this continuation I saw it would be advantageous to *it*, if permissible for me, to introduce what might be said in rejoinder to Mr. Caird. Accordingly, I occupied myself for some time in this direction. The result, however, was a paper so long that I have been obliged to divide it. The half now given (which regards Mr. Caird), had it been alone concerned, might have appeared three months ago. Why it should precede the other half—publication being once determined upon—will be understood without difficulty.

there in Mr. Caird, is a taking for granted of the correctness of Schopenhauer in his objection to Kant, at the same time that a justification is tendered *for* Kant, which, though simply warping the one vice into an ultimate exquisite extreme, proceeds, surely — with due recompense of resultant glory — only from the deeper insight of the more accomplished student! In view, then, of such things — even with discount of the factitious cry of misrepresentation, misrepresentation, that is on their credit risked — further reference to Mr. Caird on my part may not only “to many appear superfluous,” but actually unworthy. Nevertheless, like the writer quoted, I aim at public utility, and shall allow myself, so far as concerns Mr. Caird’s reference to Kant’s causality, a discussion in detail. And yet I have, in truth, amply indicated above the entire state of the case.

When a man is caught unfortunately blundering, he is apt — especially perhaps in these days of unscrupulous party-trickery — to “kick up a dust,” as the phrase goes, and “die hard,” or even, as it were, to throw into the air a handful of such dust, *trivial* dust, hard-won, with the hope that the default,—appearances being kept up, and the look of saying something — may in this way obtain a cover at least from the eyes of the groundlings. The expedient, for the most part, however, only baffles itself, and magnifies exposure. Better, far better, it were, in such circumstances, when one is not great or generous enough simply to kiss the rod, then, instead of resorting to an expedient at all, just to hold one’s tongue.

Mr. Caird opens his reply by asserting that “Dr. Stirling’s remarks contain an entire misrepresentation of my views; and I should never have supposed that any one could ascribe such to me, had not Dr. Stirling actually done so.” Mr. Caird refers also to Dr. Stirling’s “attack,” but is good enough to declare that he has “no wish to retaliate.” Now, if I am to be regarded as a proper object for such words, I must, perforce, be regarded also as something very equivocal; and the duty of defence, accordingly, would seem imposed upon me, so far at least as the words are demonstrably unjust. Nevertheless, I should probably say little or nothing in that direction but for the prospective service to Kant.

In the article in question, out of fifty pages, only eight concern Mr. Caird; and they are certainly not an “attack.” Neither, then, properly, do they admit of “retaliation.” But, so far as writing of mine is before the public, Mr. Caird is as free as any other man to remark upon it. I deprecate no man’s speech, and expect always the usual mishaps.

Mr. Caird was the single professor in Scotland who was currently understood to make common cause with myself in philosophy; while otherwise, at least as I took it, we were on terms of amity. It is not easy to describe, therefore, in what unwelcome quandary I felt myself when I opened Mr. Caird's book. What appeared to me to be before me was not—at least as I had instructed myself, and so far as I saw—Kant, but an inapplicable myth, an alien and isolated dream, an unfortunate, but unmistakable fiasco. Let it be observed, however, that I say, *as I had instructed myself, and as far as I saw (read)*. Going no farther than the one consideration, I explain that the other concerns only what to me is Kant's centre, the categories. I was surprised, then I grieved, and I disapproved; but I held no patent of chamberlain or censor in philosophy; it was not for me, unless on special call, to open my mouth. Accordingly, I staved off speech, till accident rendered such call too audible to be longer resisted; but even then—after some two years—I was at express and very real pains to say (in the before-mentioned eight pages) only the least possible. And now this is the result. I shall have “attacked” Mr. Caird; I shall have “entirely misrepresented” Mr. Caird; and I am to be thankful that I am spared the “retaliation” of Mr. Caird! The position is sufficiently grave. I do not see that anything is left me but to act *genuinely* up to it. I shall still say, however, the least possible—restricting myself, too, to what is immediately before me. Nay, as intimated, in what I may say I shall rather have in view what is to me the true understanding of Kant than any opposition to Mr. Caird.

Mr. Caird conditions his reply in this way: that he “passes over some almost verbal criticisms,” denies one allegation, justifies another, ignores Schopenhauer, and winds up magnanimously abnegative, with renunciation of the right to “retaliate.” We may allow such surface as this the praise of ingenuity; but, alas! surface is surface, and ingenuity, when it is *only* ingenuity, a smoke that disappears even as it is looked at. But, be that as it may, the account, as it stands, seems to contain but one element that calls for notice on my part. There is only one allegation of mine, namely, that Mr. Caird denies; everything else that is said by me, Mr. Caird either justifies or passes over as verbal. But if, out of several allegations, only one be excepted to, does not such a phrase as “Dr. Stirling's remarks contain an *entire* misrepresentation of my views,” look rather like a contradiction in terms? But there is more than that. *The allegation denied by Mr. Caird is nowhere made by me; it is an invention of Mr. Caird's own.* Never, consequently, was a charge of

“entire” misrepresentation, or of “misrepresentation” at all, more insecurely situated.

Mr. Caird charges me with accusing him of “asserting, and asserting as the doctrine of Kant, that objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone.” *I cannot find a word of this in anything that I say of Mr. Caird.* All through my article on Schopenhauer, all through my remarks on Mr. Caird, I talk of “successions,” “sequences,” only. I know not that the word “objects” ever occurs, even in what relates to Schopenhauer; but I know well that if ever it does occur, and surely it must, it refers only to the successions and sequences with which every other sentence positively bristles. In what relates to Mr. Caird in this connection, however, this word “objects” *never* occurs — *not once!* There is not a single expression in all the relative pages, that could even yield to torture the allegation made for me by Mr. Caird. The reader can easily make good this for himself. The last three pages (of the eight) alone refer to any allegation of Mr. Caird’s in connection with causality. A glance will show this, and it will require little more than a glance to do the necessary reading. The phrase, “assertion that objectivity results from the category of causality alone,” occurs certainly *once*; but, though the only one that might seem as much as to approach the relative suggestion, it would not, as I say, even yield to torture the allegation made for me. The bare word “objectivity” cannot be replaced at will by the word “objects;” and, as it stands, it is no bare word. On the contrary, even in that position it is, with quite a superfluity of expression, made known to the reader as the *objectivity of succession*. Look to all the connections in which it stands! The first sentence, in the same reference, immediately *above*, runs thus: “These are successions — necessary successions, too — and they are absolutely independent of causality, whether as existent or cognized.” The first sentence, likewise, in the same reference, immediately *below*, runs again thus: “Kant, consequently, cannot even dream of making cognition of succession, as such, conditional on presupposition of succession causal.” The words almost directly next, too, are: “bestow objectivity, and so bestow objectivity that even the succession of a house is not subjective,” etc. In short, while “objects” are never once mentioned, there is no “objectivity” spoken of that is not the objectivity of “successions.” Repeated more than once, and repeated always in the same way, this is my charge against Mr. Caird: —

“It was a fearful blunder on the part of Schopenhauer to suppose Kant considered the succession of the house subjective, and no succession objective but

that of causality alone. As we see, Mr. Caird fully indorses that blunder—the radical blunder that is the theme of this essay; but then, further, he out-Herods Herod. Schopenhauer, even making the prodigious blunder he did, was never so far left to himself as to conceive the cognition of succession, as succession, only possible to Kant on presupposition of causality. Following on was to him as much *sui generis* as following from. One vainly turns the eye round and round in search of how and where Mr. Caird could get even the dream of such things. Kant shall have held it impossible to cognize the rows on his book-shelves, the steps on his stairs, the laths in his venetians, etc., endlessly, unless on presupposition of the category of causality! Why, there are successions even *necessarily* in the form of A. B. C. D., etc., which are not causal, and utterly independent of causality in any reference,” etc.

But if these sentences contain, as they do, the whole charge (and on all its aspects) ever made by me, in a causal reference, against Mr. Caird—if every sentence that I write in that connection (even of rows, steps, laths) concerns successions, explicitly concerns successions only—why has Mr. Caird, of his own motive and free will, converted “successions” into “objects,” and, denying me the proposition that is mine, gratuitously complimented me with another that is his?

Perhaps some light will be obtained here if we consider Mr. Caird’s second<sup>1</sup> proposition,—the one, namely, which he justifies. It is this: “Objective sequence cannot be known except by a mind that connects phenomena as causes and effects.” Let us compare with this, now, his first proposition (“objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone”), when corrected. Let us replace,—that is, “objects” by objectivity of sequence, or, what is palpably the same thing, objective sequence, which was what Mr. Caird, of his own act, removed, and we shall have this proposition: “Objective sequence is known as objective sequence through the category of causality alone.” Would not one require some instrument more powerful than microscope or telescope, to discover wherein the one proposition differed from the other? And yet, on the strength of Mr. Caird’s own wilful manipulation, we have *two* propositions—one which is *justified*, and *another* which is *denied*! “I should never have supposed,” says Mr. Caird, with a charming air of outraged, but meekly forgiving virtue, “that any one could ascribe it to me, had not Dr. Stirling actually done so!”

Now, the reader will be pleased to observe that the result before us is not owing to any intercalation of mine; it is the result simply of

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<sup>1</sup> I find I have inverted the order of Mr. Caird’s propositions; but, that being understood, no inconvenience will result.

the substitution of fact for fiction, and the whole procedure is as *objective* as any demonstration in Euclid.

Will the reader in truth be but pleased to observe, further, this: that the common proposition is Mr. Caird's one original and peculiar proposition (of unity) in regard to Kant? In Mr. Caird's book, the title of page 456 is, "Schopenhauer's Objection to the Deduction of Causality;" and the immediately following title (458) is, "The Judgment of Sequence Implies the Judgment of Causality." Now, this means that while, as regards the first title, Schopenhauer's objection is admitted to be relevant, yet, as regards the second title, Kant's matter in objection is expressly justified. What is alluded to as Schopenhauer's objection is, that he "denies the Kantian doctrine that objective sequence implies causality," having first pointed out inconsistency on the part of Kant for the "statement that we can have a judgment of sequence which is not objective." Schopenhauer, as we may recollect, considered himself to prove against Kant that while, on the one hand, we could have objective sequence without causality, Kant's own case, on the other hand, of subjectivity in sequence for alleged want of the category of causality, was, in reality, no case of subjectivity, but, on the contrary, a case of objectivity, due, too, to the very category (causality) said to be wanting. Objective sequence without causality he instanced in reference to the tile, day and night, etc., and the alleged subjectivity of the *house* he converted into objectivity by the movement of the eye.

Well, now, Mr. Caird is quite in agreement generally with Schopenhauer — only that his peculiar doctrine of unity obliges him to go a little farther. To Mr. Caird, for instance, it is inconsistent on Kant's part to suppose sequence (as in the house) possibly subjective, at the same time that the Kantian doctrine truly is (for him) what Schopenhauer says it is — "that objective sequence implies causality." So far he is quite as Schopenhauer — blunders quite as he about the house, and causality being alone the category of objectivity — thankfully accepting, also, the brilliant conceit of the eye (and just these things constitute that wherein I shall have "entirely misrepresented" Mr. Caird!); but, then, there comes the step farther, that, against Schopenhauer's objection to the Kantian doctrine of objective sequence implying causality, he *justifies* Kant! Yes, at page 458, under the title, "The Judgment of Sequence Implies the Judgment of Causality," Mr. Caird is at express pains directly to justify Kant for maintaining that very *dictum*; and his reason is that



universal cryptic unity which, for him, Kant attributes to all things. No wonder, then, that we have (in his reply) Mr. Caird's second proposition, together with the perception on his part, that, in consequence of such out-and-out and undeniable breadth of doctrine, iterated and reiterated in his book, said proposition must at all hazards be acknowledged, and if possible vindicated. "Objective sequence cannot be known except by a mind that connects phenomena as causes and effects." Or again, "The judgment of sequence implies the judgment of causality." Or yet again (omitting the various other forms already seen about the *post hoc*, the *propter hoc*, etc.), "Objective sequence implies causality." Compare with these propositions that other, "Objective sequence is known through the category of causality alone." As already said, surely no instrument that ever was invented will enable us to discover this last proposition — "but in the estimation of a hair" — to differ from the rest. Yet this last proposition is that with which I charged Mr. Caird; I certainly did not charge him with "objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone." How the one proposition ever became the other, it is not for me to explain. Neither do I make any accusation; I only point out the advantage which has been obtained by the possession of two propositions, such that, though in import identical, there could be a face of denial for the one, and equally a face of justification for the other. If any possible difference, indeed, can be found between them, the latter it is that must be pronounced the more flagrant; for while the one that is denied asserts of *objective* sequence only that it is known by causality, the other, that is justified, asserts the same thing of sequence at all. In two of the forms given above, the word "objective" appears; but the formal justification that, under the title "The Judgment of Sequence Implies the Judgment of Causality," occupies two pages, is to the effect that sequence at all, as known or experienced, presupposes causality. That is Mr. Caird's own proper and peculiar doctrine.

But, however this be, and attributing the conversion of objectivity (of succession) into "objects" to what cause we may, there is no reason, so far as I am concerned, why Mr. Caird should be balked of a meeting, even on his own terms. I have not accused Mr. Caird of "asserting, and asserting as the doctrine of Kant, that objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone." But I will now do so. In short, I will now accuse Mr. Caird of asserting, and asserting as the doctrine of Kant, first, "that objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone;" and, second, that

“objective sequence cannot be known except by a mind that connects phenomena as causes and effects.” I will now, I say, so accuse Mr. Caird; and I will further assert that what he assumes to deny, he can *not* deny, and what he assumes to justify, he can *not* justify. The issues here, then, are unmistakable, and they are expressed in Mr. Caird’s own words.

At first sight, this may have a very equivocal look on my part. Why, it may be thought, should I have made so much of Mr. Caird’s conversion of a phrase, at the very moment that I was about to justify it? Is not this conduct glaringly contradictory, and how can we be expected to give attention to what, in such circumstances, may be a *tour de force*, but cannot be serious? The objection is not unnatural, but it will not be found to lie. Observe how differently we are placed, Mr. Caird and I. It will not be denied that I was quite within my rights to object to the conversion as a conversion. Still less will it be denied that I was all the more justified to object to this conversion, in view of the use to which Mr. Caird turned it. Again, it is quite possible for me, without inconsistency, to regard the two propositions as identical; but that is impossible for Mr. Caird, unless with immersion into a very Maelstrom of contradiction. Mr. Caird’s two propositions, for example, are either identical or different. If they are identical, then Mr. Caird must either deny what he justifies, or justify what he denies. If different, again — why, I fear that horn is even the worst of all! Mr. Caird *could not* deny his determination of things into time by causality in such manner that there was an all-pervading unity in this universe, both in whole and in part. But, reminded of the other categories, he bethought himself that he did apply them in “determination” of “objects,” no matter what he might have taught or thought about “*objectivity*,” and, so bethinking himself, he took courage to say as much, *or even a little more*. Why, however, he should have so completely changed my words, remains to be explained; but it would be cruel, as it is now unnecessary, indeed, to press the point.

But, as intimated, all is differently situated in my case, the proposition attributed to Kant is not parcel justified and parcel denied by me — it is wholly denied; and, in the denial, it does not in the least signify whether the false action on the part of causality is said of objects or of objective sequences. But it is this we have now to see.

As he so wills it, I accuse Mr. Caird of asserting, then, and “asserting as the doctrine of Kant, that objects are known as objects

through the category of causality alone." But, standing now before this plain issue, let me prefatorily touch on a general point or two. The occasion of my reference to either Schopenhauer or Mr. Caird has been already explained, and I think it will be allowed to have been sufficiently simple, natural, and irresistible. Surely, too, it will also be allowed that, once having entered on the reference, I took every care to be exact. I placed before the reader, even anxiously translated, the whole relative section of Schopenhauer; and while resolved that there should be no mistake as to the state of my mind with respect to Mr. Caird's work, I constrained my expressions in every possible manner that appeared to me legitimate. I confined myself, on the *general merits*, to mere indication; and, as regarded the *particular issues* which I had necessarily to confront on causality, I was at pains to quote fully and fairly Mr. Caird's own words, and then — to say only the least possible.

In such circumstances, the charge of misrepresentation seems, again, to say the least, extraordinary. The issues raised are so unequivocal! Schopenhauer had found a certain *house* of Kant's *subjective*, but had volunteered to make it the *objective* thing it plainly ought to be, by the ingenious or ingenuous expedient of moving his eyes. That was the whole. And that — literally that, in both of its clauses — seemed adopted by Mr. Caird. Here are his own words: —

"Kant distinguishes two cases: The case of such an object as a house, where the sequence of our perceptions is reversible; and the case of a boat sailing down a river, where it is irreversible. We can begin with either the top or the bottom of the house, but we cannot see the movements of the boat except in one order. In the latter case, therefore, as Kant argues, we give to our perception of succession an objective value; but in the former case we regard it as merely subjective; or, what is the same thing, in the latter case we bring the sequence of our perceptions under the category of causality, and in the former case we do not.

"Kant either forgets, or abstracts for the moment from the fact, that whether we say the sequence is due (as in the case of the house) to the movement of our organs of sense, or whether we say that it is due to the movements of the objects perceived (as in the case of the boat), in both cases we make a judgment of objective sequence."

Evidently, whether as concerns Schopenhauer or Mr. Caird, the *house*, in regard to which they both perfectly agree, is the centre of the whole business. Let us quote now from II., 753, and see how it is situated with Kant in the same reference: —

"If, for example, therefore, I take into observation the empirical perception of a house, through apperception of its complex of parts, there underlies it for me the necessary unity of space and of external sense-perception generally —

and I limn, as it were, its shape in accordance with this synthetic unity of the parts in space. But just the same synthetic unity has its seat in the understanding when I abstract from the form of space, and is the category of the *synthesis of the homogeneous* in a perception in general—*i.e.*, the category of quantity; completely in accord with which must be, therefore, said synthesis of apprehension—*i.e.*, of perception.”

This, evidently, is an example of how the category quantity acts on the perceptive complex of a house. It is followed by another in reference to the freezing of water, which illustrates the action of the category cause. Both examples are, so to speak, conducted in the very same way, and on the very same principles. No preference is given to the one category over the other; the word “objective” does not happen to be used of either; but both are named, and equally named, and in the same way named, “synthetic unities of the understanding,” which again are also equally, and in the same way, named “conditions *à priori*.” There can be no doubt whatever that, considering what these phrases mean, both examples are regarded by Kant as equally objective. There is a note, indeed, that directly says this. This note, moreover, is not referred to the conclusion of the common passage, but directly and expressly to the paragraph on the house. It proceeds thus: “In such way it is proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must be necessarily in accord with the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual, and completely contained in the category.” And that names the process quite generally whereby a category raises a subjective multiple in apprehension into an objective unity in apperception. The house, then, *is* objective to Kant; and it is quite inexplicable why it should have been considered subjective by Schopenhauer. No one, at least as I think, can read the passage even in the second analogy without seeing that the ship-series is not regarded by Kant as one whit more objective than the house-series. Schopenhauer’s mistake, however, arises from the first words in the immediately following paragraph: “I shall, therefore, in our case, necessarily derive the *subjective* sequence of apprehension from the *objective sequence* of the perceptions,” etc.; where, to have known that all sequence in *apprehension*, when apprehension, as mere susceptibility of sense, is opposed to the apperception of understanding—to have known that all such sequence is only *subjective*, would have been of small credit even to a first year’s student of Kant.

As for Mr. Caird’s mistake, its origin lies in the mistake of Schopenhauer. How it was that, in matters so glaring, Mr. Caird allowed himself to be imposed upon is another question.

It is a glaring error to say the house was subjective to Kant; and it is a more glaring error—it is even a terrible error—the most terrible error possible in a student of Kant—to say that Kant holds causality to be singly, alone, and in exception to all the rest, the category of objectivity. Why, when directly, and expressly, and alone considering such topics generally, was Mr. Caird silent on a misunderstanding, on the part of Schopenhauer, so glaring, on a misunderstanding so terrible? Nay, seeing that he himself had actually adopted the *glaring* misunderstanding, would one have very heinously erred, had one attributed to Mr. Caird, *if for nothing but his extraordinary silence in such a case*, the terrible misunderstanding as well?

It is very curious to think, with all that before one, that Mr. Caird, once for all so very peculiarly implicated in merely following the lead of Schopenhauer, should (in his reply) not attempt to justify Schopenhauer in any one single point whatever. On the contrary, he indirectly admits the whole burden of transgression that has been proved against Schopenhauer. His words are these: “Dr. Stirling’s charge is based upon the fact that I refer to Schopenhauer, on one occasion, in connection with the category of causality. But surely one may refer to an author without adopting, or (as was the case here) without even remembering, all his opinions.” One wonders what Mr. Caird can refer to as not remembered, when he was writing the passage in question; for that there was something he did not remember is positively asserted; it was “the case here,” he says. It is sufficiently strange, however, that Mr. Caird should not have “remembered” all about Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer’s name is in Mr. Caird’s preface as that of one to whom he “owes most;” Schopenhauer’s name is in the contents; Schopenhauer’s name is in the index; Schopenhauer’s name in on his page-margin; Schopenhauer’s name is again and again in his text. Nay, Mr. Caird was not, so to speak, *asked* to remember “all Schopenhauer’s opinions;” Mr. Caird was referred to as considering “Schopenhauer’s objection to the deduction of causality”—as considering that objection alone—the precise one point that, in Mr. Caird’s regard, I brought in question. When Mr. Caird discussed “Schopenhauer’s objection to the deduction of causality,” surely that was what he did discuss, and surely that alone was what he could be expected, what he could be asked to remember. All that he *mentioned* he surely remembered; and he certainly mentioned those opinions of Schopenhauer which were the express objects of my discussion. *Non mi ricordo* is not a plea that can be admitted

to record here, then. Mr. Caird had expressly to do in Schopenhauer with what I had to do, and both by silence and by speech — however extraordinary that was, however damning that was — he gave it the most significant support. In very fulness of his heart, indeed, viewing Schopenhauer's assistance in the composition of his work, Mr. Caird, when that work is accomplished, cannot help tendering express thanks to Schopenhauer as one to whom he "owes most." And what *did* Mr. Caird owe to Schopenhauer? What *could* Mr. Caird owe to Schopenhauer — what but these same extraordinary deliverances on causality? That reference — the reference to Schopenhauer on causality — is express, and full, and at large. There is only one allusion to Schopenhauer elsewhere in Mr. Caird's whole book, and it is a trifle about weight, which is rejected by Mr. Caird himself, and dispatched in a clause. The conclusion is inevitable, then, that the contributions for which Mr. Caird so expressly thanks Schopenhauer concerned causality alone. Perhaps it was they, indeed, that suggested to Mr. Caird that original step *beyond* Schopenhauer. All the more curious it is, then, that he should not have remembered this; the rather, too, that it was the only thing he was, so to speak, *asked* to remember. But let us come, now, to the two allegations.

Mr. Caird complains that he is accused of "asserting, and asserting as the doctrine of Kant, that objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone;" and his reply is: This "assertion has never been made by me; it is inconsistent with many express statements of my book; and I should never have supposed that any one could ascribe it to me, had not Dr. Stirling actually done so." To this, discounting all that we know about such words not being mine, my rejoinder is that *I homologate the accusation*. Mr. Caird's language, as discussed in my Schopenhauer article, directly contained the assertion; and what he brings forward now, whether by quotation or by reference, as proof of the contrary doctrine, contains no such proof.

Had a contrary doctrine really existed elsewhere in Mr. Caird's book, it would have been no misrepresentation on my part only truly to represent what was then and there before me; and that I did. The *expression* of an opposite doctrine may exist in Mr. Caird's book; but it seems even yet to be beyond Mr. Caird's consciousness. Mr. Caird does not succeed, in his reply, to refer to a single true case of it; and that such *expression* should occur, or even *must* occur, we have at once the explanation and the guarantee in the fact that Kant's own language must at times not only be directly referred to, but actually

quoted. The existence, in fact, of any number of contrary doctrines in Mr. Caird's book would be no surprise to me—in view, that is, of his own equipment for the work, and the principles on which it appears to have been conducted. It is said of Schelling, in reference to his successive publications of varying systems (to call them so), that he carried on his studies “before the public;” and, perhaps, something similar may be relevantly said of Mr. Caird and the successive chapters of his Kant. Mr. Caird, namely, does not seem, if we may be allowed to judge from what we see, to have first articulated Kant to his own self, and *then* to have re-articulated him for the public. On the contrary, one would figure him to have studied Kant simply from chapter to chapter, and to have written down his results just as they came to hand, without referring them the one to the other, and all together to any correlating ground-plan of the whole—a ground-plan which he had previously been at the pains to put together for himself. But, such considerations apart, what alone occupied me (in my former article) was Mr. Caird on “Schopenhauer's objection to the deduction of causality,” at pp. 456–460. The reader can examine these for himself, and draw his own conclusions. I, for my part, assert them unequivocally to contain the doctrine with which I charged Mr. Caird, even as by him strained; and what satisfies me in proof, are considerations both of silence and of speech. To call Kant's *house* subjective was a monstrous error on the part of Schopenhauer; but to hold Kant to regard his category of causality as alone the agent of objectivity in perception, was an error infinitely more monstrous—an error that struck at the foundation of the whole building—an error that summarily sisted any pretending expositor's entire case—an error that was simply ruin at once both to principal and accessary. Now, both errors being *the* matters—wholly and solely *the* matters—expressly and directly viewed, it never once struck Mr. Caird—even in passing—to call *Schopenhauer wrong!* On the contrary, like Schopenhauer, he directly calls the *house* subjective; and, like Schopenhauer, he *unequivocally* expresses himself as implying the conviction that causality is alone, of all Kant's categories, the objectifying minister. Surely that silence, in such a case, is not less significant than this speech! But what does it imply that Mr. Caird finds himself obliged, with Schopenhauer, to regard the *house*, as in spite of Kant, objective—obliged, therefore, further, and still with Schopenhauer, to *make* the house objective, and *show* it objective? Schopenhauer, as there is, to his belief, but one category of objectivity to Kant, thinks himself under a necessity, for the due effecting of the operation and the proof required, to have recourse to

that category — the category of causality alone. And Mr. Caird, whatever the state of his belief, certainly is at pains, though without alluding in this particular to Schopenhauer, to *objectify* the house in the same preposterous and amusing manner as Schopenhauer! The illustrations of house and freezing water were actually previously before him — a good way back, however — and he seems to have forgotten them. Or did he not forget them, and is it not rather, that though he applied, then, quantity to the house and causality to the freezing water, he was not aware of the full force of what he himself did; but that, determining the house by quantity, he yet left it subjective, and only in the other case produced objectivity. For it is vain to point to the other categories and ask, What could be meant, if by their determination there was not meant objectivity, or what could it be supposed that the other categories were there for? Such question, I say, in its very suggestion (and I suppose it is, on the whole, my own), ought to carry great weight with it; but it is wholly vain in the circumstances. If it could bestead Mr. Caird, for example, it ought equally to bestead Schopenhauer, who speaks of all the other categories a hundred times, and yet holds causality to be Kant's sole agent of objectivity! Mr. Caird, indeed, uses the other (mathematical) categories for *determination*; but the determination is only in imagination, it is not objective. But, be all that as it may, it is quite certain that Mr. Caird did at one time *determine* the house by quantity. Now, however, that he is a hundred pages farther, it is equally certain that the house is to him only subjective, and that he finds himself under the same obligation as Schopenhauer to make it objective by the same expedient of causality alone! Is the conclusion at all unfair that Mr. Caird must, like Schopenhauer, have regarded quantity — and if quantity, surely other categories — as ineffective of objectivity, but causality, on the contrary, as in that function, alone effective? No one, as it appears to me, can read these four pages (complemented, say, by what concerns causality on 451 and 455) without finding this conclusion formally supported by every consecutive sentence.

Mr. Caird begins his consideration of Schopenhauer's "objection" by the passage that declares the reversible house-series subjective, and the irreversible ship-series objective. "In the latter case, therefore, as Kant argues, we give to our perception of succession an objective value," he says, "but in the former case we regard it as merely subjective; or, what is the same thing, in the latter case we bring the sequence in our perceptions under the category of causality, and in the former case we do not."

Now, there is much here that is instructive to us, and that must be



borne in mind as we proceed. It is to be observed, for example, that the words sequence and succession are synonymous. They both mean the same thing, and are indifferently used by Mr. Caird, as by everybody else. Again, holding the views he does about the *post hoc*, necessarily presupposing and depending on the *propter hoc*, objective sequence is to him not one whit stronger than sequence simply, nor objective succession one whit stronger than succession simply. These expressions likewise are synonymous to Mr. Caird; and these, too, as actual extracts will probably sufficiently suggest, are indifferent to him. Lastly, in this reference, the word "objects" is to Mr. Caird, as it is to Kant, synonymous with "objective sequences and successions," or with "sequences and successions" simply. As regards Kant, an object, we learn from II., 97, is "a one consciousness which unites into one representation the part by part perceived, and then reproduced, many, manifold, or multiple of units of impression." Then, 108: "A presentation to sense contains a manifold; consequently, in its case a multiplicity of perceptions are found in the mind, separate and single in themselves." Again, 157: "Our apprehension of the manifold of the presentation is always successive;" as, 168: "In the synthesis of presentations the manifold of impressions always follow each other" (*i.e.*, the units of the manifold). The same doctrine is to be found at 733, 740, 741, and, indeed, *passim*. Mr. Caird's testimony and doctrine are to an identical effect. He says (339), "Ere we can perceive any individual object as such, we must have a manifold before us, and we must combine this manifold into a unity; but to distinguish the elements of the manifold means, in the case of a successive consciousness like ours, to distinguish the times in which the manifold is given." That is, plainly, all objects are successions—sequences in time. The same thing is repeated again and again by Mr. Caird; but for certainty here we need not leave the materials which are presently before us. "The sequences of our perceptions," Mr. Caird says, "in the case of such an object as a house, are reversible," while, "in the case of a boat sailing down a river" they are "irreversible." Here the two objects (one of them a house) are plainly put upon the same level of sequence or succession. It is no objection to this that Mr. Caird proceeds to call the one succession subjective, and the other objective; for he immediately turns to causality, in order by that means to make the house-succession quite as objective, and in the same way objective, as the succession of the ship. He argues, indeed, that we must not separate the two cases; that we must not have a judgment of sequence in our perceptions which is

not a judgment of causality. And he illustrates this assertion by showing that, in the case of the house, we make the sequence objective just in the same manner as we make the sequence objective in the case of the ship. "In both cases we make a judgment of objective sequence." To Mr. Caird, as to Kant, then, all objects are successions or sequences in time of units of impression, and no one object is more so than another. Here is proof absolute that Mr. Caird did assert that "objects are known as *objects* through the category of causality alone;" for objectivity of sequence, plainly—that is, an object as an *object*—is due to causality alone. Yet, says Mr. Caird, this "assertion has never been made by me, and I should never have supposed that any one could ascribe it to me," etc.! In fact, as is but too manifest, discussion at all with Mr. Caird is superfluously idle—but for the lesson as regards Kant. Should it appear, too, as I may say again, that Mr. Caird was not so very culpable in changing my objectivity of succession into his "objects,"—the words now being declared synonymous by myself,—let the *use* be once more considered which Mr. Caird made of the *semblance* of difference thereby gained. Like Schopenhauer, he asserted Kant to ascribe objectivity to causality alone; he even went a step farther, and asserted Kant to ascribe sequence as sequence, *post hoc* as *post hoc*, whether as judged or experienced, to the sequence causal, the sequence *propter hoc*. By substitution of "objects" for objectivity of sequence, he was able to give the one clause, in the above common matter, the appearance of being opposed to the other; and so, consequently, there was something to be denied; and, again, there was something to be justified. The difference in the identity was eminently convenient, not but that it is equally easy for us quietly to put back the original identity—identity even with a little excess in the one clause—and that the one, not that is denied, but that is expressly and laboriously *justified*!

But to return to the extract before us, in description of what succession is subjective and what objective. Surely, if words are ever to be allowed a meaning at all—surely those words mean, and must mean, and can only mean that, "to give to our perception of succession an objective value," is "*the same thing*" as to "bring the sequence in our perceptions under the category of causality;" while, to regard our perception of succession "as merely subjective," is "*the same thing*" as *not* "to bring the sequence in our perceptions under the category of causality."

"Now, it is evident that if this were the only proof for the transcendental necessity of the principle of causality, we *could* have a judgment of sequence

(viz., in our own perceptions) which was not a judgment of causality, and thus Kant's argument against Hume would lose all its force."

It is thus Mr. Caird continues, and truly these words also contain revelations unmistakable. They assume, in the first place, Kant's contrast of the house and the ship to have been intended by him as "proof for the transcendental necessity of the principle of causality." It never even crossed Kant's brain to imagine that his simple contrast in illustration of difference of sense-many, under difference of categorical unity, could ever be supposed a "proof," and a proof of what never as much as occurred to him in dream, that causality was alone the agent of objectivity! But Mr. Caird, for his part, has no doubt about this "proof." Seeing that the objectivity of the one series is contrasted with the subjectivity of the other, there can be nothing in Kant's mind, he thinks, but an argument in behoof of what it never seems to have occurred to Mr. Caird (following Schopenhauer) even to question—the one sole minister of objectivity-causality. Still, Kant to Mr. Caird does not say enough for causality. If this were the "only proof," he thinks, then, in view of the sequence of the house (even suppose it subjective only), "we *could* have a judgment of sequence which was not a judgment of causality." Evidently, the possibility of a judgment of sequence which was not a judgment of causality loomed little less at that time to Mr. Caird than a catastrophe,—a catastrophe that must prove fatal to the whole common industry. It was so sun-clear to him then that we can *not* have a judgment of sequence in our own perceptions other than a judgment of causality! Nor must this be limited to the house; all objects whatever are, on the consideration of succession, situated quite as the house is. Plainly, then, we cannot have a judgment of objects, as objects, that is not a judgment of causality—again the assertion which Mr. Caird never made, and which so righteously surprises him! But, further, in what case would "Kant's argument against Hume lose all its force?" Why, that would happen, manifestly, just if "we *could* have a judgment of sequence in our own perceptions which was not a judgment of causality." That, then, is, to Mr. Caird, Kant's argument against Hume: we cannot have a judgment of sequence which is not a judgment of causality—the *post hoc* depends on the *propter hoc*! Unless all judgments of sequence are causal, Kant's argument against Hume fails! Kant no more argues against Hume, or at all, that all sequence is causal, than I argue that Tenterden steeple is the cause of Goodwyn Sands. Kant's argument against Hume is as relevant to Tenterden steeple

or to Goodwyn Sands as to the argument ascribed to him by Mr. Caird. Kant says to Hume only this: I grant all that you say, and the evidence of sense can only be contingent; but I have discovered a whole system of *Epigenesis*, which, descending upon the things of sense, whether in series causal or in series non-causal, elevates them into necessity. One wonders at what Mr. Caird sees instead of this; one wonders at what Mr. Caird *denies*. Hume's question is, Why is the unquestionable contingent *post hoc* of mere sense supposed, in certain cases, to be, after all, necessary? Kant's answer — to take it roughly, on the whole, but, on the whole, still truly — is: There are twelve *post hocs*, and being received, respectively, into twelve chequers of my twelvefold *epigenesis*, they thereby *become* necessary. Not a ghost of an idea of the process involved in this *become* ever struck Mr. Caird; causality is to him an absolute nail in an absolutely fixed universe.

Mr. Caird, then, will save causality from the catastrophe threatened it by Kant's "forgetfulness or abstraction for the moment." He will show that even in the house, contrary to the example made of it by Kant, causality is the minister of the sequence. We have seen the sentence more than once already, and need not quote. We know that Schopenhauer, conceiving the ship-series to be due to the movements of the object perceived, and to be therefore pronounced causal, and consequently objective, turned the tables on Kant (who, poor man, had only made the house objective by quantity), and proved that the house-sequence, being due to the movements of our organs of sense, was therefore equally causal, and, consequently, equally objective. We know, too, that, though without acknowledgment, Mr. Caird has repeated all this — "in both cases we make a judgment of objective sequence." Mr. Caird will show Kant, with gentle reproach of his oblivion for the moment, that it is a mistake to suppose sequence, as non-causal, only subjective in the house; on the contrary, as a moment's thought will suggest, it is really causal and objective!

"And if it be true that we can date events in time only in so far as we can put them in causal relation with each other, in both cases alike there must be a judgment of causality. Kant, in fact, has here made the inconsistent admission that one kind of sequence can be determined without any help from the principle of causality. But if we could determine one kind of sequence without reference to causality, it would be difficult to prove that causality is necessary to determine any other kind of sequence. Kant's argument can be valid only if it is made universal — *i.e.*, if it is shown that all judgments of sequence are implicitly judgments of causality. And the remark, *mutatis mutandis*, holds good of judgments of reciprocity and coexistence" — (*i.e.*, that these, too, are judgments of causality).

That is perfectly in accord with Schopenhauer: that “in both cases we make a judgment of objective sequence,” and “in both cases alike there must be a judgment of causality.” And if that does not mean that, for production of a judgment of objective sequence, a judgment of causality is, simple as it stands there, a *necessity*, then it may mean Tenterden steeple, or Goodwyn Sands, or green cheese, or the plains of Marathon, or the Magellan clouds, or whatever else anybody may simply wish. It is a pity, however, to see at last the little rift in the lute — a pupil so docible showing signs to leave his master at last. At three seconds to one o’clock, Herr Dr. Schopenhauer went to his own door, and at two seconds to one o’clock — the very next second, that is — a tile bonneted him; but that was necessarily all a dream of the worthy Herr Doctor’s own, for “we can date events in time only in so far as we can put them in causal relation to each other,” and that is impossible in the case of Herr Dr. Schopenhauer bonneted by the house-tile. It is the Herr Doctor, himself, has introduced the illustration, and as demonstrating the fact that all sequences are not causal. Mr. Caird, however, is so pledged to the suppositious Kant that he will maintain the possibility even of sequence, as sequence, to depend upon the judgment of causality. That is the proposition we have to see Mr. Caird justify; and that is a proposition that, surely, may be named an *à fortiori* to the proposition he denies! Comment, indeed, is quite superfluous with expressions so very glaring confronting us. To be consistent, for example, Kant ought to rule that all sequence, even in a house, is determined by causality alone. Without help of that principle no sequence can be determined. If any one sequence could be determined without such help, it would be difficult to prove it for any. The argument must be made universal — all judgments of sequence are implicitly judgments of causality. Causality, indeed, is the universal agent; and it is implied, not only in the sequence of the house, but in that of reciprocity also. Causality, in short, shall determine all sequence. Nay, “the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time” — “sequence is equivalent to causality!”

When Mr. Caird proceeds to justify — and that, too, in its extremest form — the doctrine of causality imputed by Schopenhauer to Kant, we naturally strike at once on another absolutely irresistible proof of his holding the proposition which he now denies. “Schopenhauer,” says Mr. Caird, “who has pointed out the inconsistency of Kant’s statement, that we can have a judgment of sequence which is not objective, also denies the Kantian doctrine, that objective sequence

implies causality. It is, he argues, absurd to say that sequence is equivalent to causality; for, in that case, we should never recognize any sequence but that between cause and effect. But night and day have followed each other constantly since the beginning of the world, without any one being tempted to find the cause of the one in the other." But, after all that has already been said, this passage may be allowed to speak for itself. Mr. Caird, far from telling Schopenhauer, as even any first year's student of Kant ought to have done, simply that such things at all are not in Kant, agrees with Schopenhauer that Kant attributes the function of objectivity to causality alone; and even justifies the latter, as reproached by the former, for holding sequence to be equivalent to causality!

Before passing to consideration, however, of the proposition suggested here, which Mr. Caird justifies, we have to see what he brings forward in his reply to prove, as alleged, the fact that he, Mr. Caird, does *not* assert "that objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone."

We have already admitted and explained how it may be, or must be, with *expressions* in Mr. Caird's book, in regard to possible occasional implication of a true Kantian doctrine; but, certainly, those which he himself either actually brings forward, or only refers to, in his own support, do not seem tantamount to even so much as that.

"In the last chapter, we have considered the principles on which phenomena are determined as objects of experience, under conditions of space and time. Taking these principles together, we reach the general idea of nature as a system of substances, whose quantum of reality always remains the same; but which, by action and reaction upon each other, are constantly changing their states according to universal laws. And this proof of this idea of nature is not dogmatic, but transcendental — *i.e.*, it is proved that without it there would exist for us no nature and no experience at all."

Mr. Caird quotes these words from "Phil. of Kant, p. 473; *cf.*, also, pp. 460, 470, etc." And if we examine into all that is definite in these references, I suppose we shall not be called to any very rigorous account should we profess ourselves to fail with the "etc." Of the passage quoted, Mr. Caird, "in these words, has declared," he says, "as clearly as possible, that the test of objective reality is to be found in the connection of experience as determined by all the categories." I, for one, however, must petition for pardon if I confess myself quite unsatisfied of this. Determination of some kind on the part of the categories, we may grant to be acknowledged by any man who simply names them. So, Mr. Caird, in lumping together all the principles on which phenomena are determined in space and

time, might very well have conceived categories included whose action was only subjective, as well as *the* category whose action was only objective. We positively know that to Mr. Caird the category quantity, though a *determining* principle, was only a *subjectively* determining principle. And, surely, the universal reference to nature is much too general to yield any evidence as to what categories were to Mr. Caird subjectively determinative, and what other was objectively determinative. When the question is of so capital a doctrine as that of objectivity being function of all the categories, and when this doctrine can be so easily made perfectly explicit in these or a thousand similar expressions, it is surely unfortunate that Mr. Caird, out of seven hundred pages expressly devoted to the subject, should have been able to quote only so vague and indefinite, so inexplicit and equivocal, so scanty and general a passage as that — the rather, too, that while attributing (what, at least, appears) exclusive objectivity of sequence to the category of causality, he expressly calls the very important category of quantity subjective!

But Mr. Caird continues: "My view, in fact, is just that which Kant expresses when he says that 'nothing is to be admitted in the empirical synthesis which could be a hindrance to the understanding in establishing the continuous connection of all phenomena in one experience.'" Was it as such "hindrance" that the category of quantity could not be "admitted" as an element in such connection; and is it not certain that what we may name, *par exemple*, Mr. Caird's doctrine, is the attribution of the thorough-going unity in question to the category of causality alone? Why, we have just read two pages under "1," in Mr. Caird's reply, which are for no other purpose than to justify such exclusive attribution! Has not this an odd look? Mr. Caird will have causality the exclusive category of objective sequence, and yet, *objects* being to him only *objective sequences*, he will still place them under all the other categories as well — that is, I suppose, quantity apart, which is subjective! Really, Mr. Caird, emphatically attributing *here* a wonderful unity to causality alone, and again as emphatically attributing *there* this same unity to all the categories, has enough to do to hold on by both arms.

I would remark, further, in this place, that in the quoted words of Mr. Caird another of his most distressing peculiarities in treating Kant extrudes itself. Mr. Caird — that is, though his own words seem to say exactly the reverse — always treats Kant "dogmatically," and never "transcendentally." The general statement of Mr. Caird is of a philosophy "dogmatically" in explanation of this universe, which is a perversion and an inversion of what it ought to be. Kant's words,

namely, are spoken of as a "proof" of an "idea of nature," and he is said to have "proved that without it there could exist for us no nature and no experience at all." That is dogmatic. We there see Kant, as some vast conjuror, coming forward to the hem of the universe, and stretching out his enchanting rod in easy explanation of it. So it always is with the exposition of Mr. Caird. The point of view from which he always looks is an utter perversion; for from that point of view Kant is always a dogmatic analyst of facts, and not a mere hypothetical projector. "Nature a system of substances, whose quantum of reality always remains the same" — that, as it is put, is a dogmatic result — a *finding* — of a thetically analyzing, thetically reasoning, positive philosophy; and an uninitiated reader looks on as at the unclosing of the book, the opening of the seals. Now, the truth is that these results, these findings, are not results, are not findings, but admitted facts of this universe now and here to hand — not proved, not found — but simply appealed to in test of the success of the hypothesis of a certain projector. Kant's work is not a philosophy. It is simply, on a certain assumption, a new theory of perception; and with the assumption the theory itself disappears into vapor. This assumption, namely, is that we know never things without, but always only ideas within. On which assumption, then, the question was, How, though knowing only contingent affection within, do we yet come to seem to know an objective universe without, that is plainly in possession also of necessary elements? In explanation of this state of the facts on the basis of the previous undoubted assumption, Kant, now, only offered us his hypothesis of an *à priori* epigenesis. The facts of experience, then, were not determined by this hypothesis; but this hypothesis itself was from stage to stage determined (tested) by these facts. Mr. Caird gives only a very misleading view of all this. And who now will grant Kant's premises? It is simply false that the objects of perception are only affections and ideas within us; they are actually independent things without. Then the prodigious *Zumuthung* that time and space are not actual entities out there on their own account, but mere spectra within our own unity — what a prodigious call on our credulity is that! All ordinary readers are advised of this, then, that the dogmatically explanatory, the thetically interpretative, the mysteriously recondite and ultimate system of philosophy which they see in Mr. Caird's book, exists — at least, so far as it is referred to Kant — only in their own dream.

What Mr. Caird, then, actually quotes from himself, while unsatisfactorily indefinite all through, seems at the last to throw on his pre-



tensions an even adverse light. Let us now turn up and realize his mere references. The one of them is this: "The determination of things as in space and time implicitly contains in it a determination, not only by the categories of quantity and quality, but also by the categories of cause, substance, and reciprocity — *i.e.*, it involves a higher synthesis than it expresses." Determination by categories, as has been pointed out already, neither need be, nor alway is, to Mr. Caird objective. We know that, to Mr. Caird, quantity is subjective; and, consequently, the other categories referred to may be all equally subjective. As the other categories are no hindrance to Schopenhauer's holding the objectivity of causality alone, so, neither need they be any hindrance to Mr. Caird's. It is quite certain that Mr. Caird conceives certain categories to be operative only on imagination — presumably, consequently, in such element, as only subjective. Nay, in such circumstances, he actually says we "represent or imagine objects without determining them as existent." It is not well possible to call anything objective that is not existent. Mr. Caird certainly attributes much more importance to the categories of relation, and he names them all; but we have already seen him subordinate reciprocity to causality, and when he talks of substance, it is always in reference to "change," and change plainly involves causality. No; let us read as we may in Mr. Caird, what always comes to the front of the question of objectivity is causality; and the other categories, let them be conceived as they may, are all either subordinate, or in actual terms subjective. It is a great mistake of Mr. Caird, indeed, to suppose that though he should be found to count on all the categories for a conjunct experience, he is thereby relieved of any one charge that has been made against him in consequence of his doctrine of causality as in connection with Schopenhauer. Even then, I should not withdraw one word which I have applied in that connection. Mr. Caird's position has been actually found to be very unsatisfactory as regards other categories; but, were that not so, all that I have said would remain essentially the same; and Mr. Caird, with *determination* of other categories in his eye, cannot protect himself from the consequences of his position, in regard to Schopenhauer and causality, by any denial of the assertion "that objects are known as objects through the category of causality alone."

The only remaining *locus* of reference in Mr. Caird's defence contains expression of an attempt generally to connect together the three categories of relation. But there, confessedly, Mr. Caird is not in Kant at all — there he fancies himself beyond Kant — there, indeed, it is to be supposed he fancies himself in Hegel. The simplicity or

stolidity of self-complacency, however, with which he alludes to the "suggestion" here, as calculated to "free Kant from many difficulties," is eminently declarative — as though there were anything in it!

We pass to the proposition which Mr. Caird justifies; and, in regard to this, no reader now can well be in any difficulty. The quotations already made from pages 456 and 457, especially the three sentences in reference to Schopenhauer pointing out Kant's inconsistency, etc., will have put every reader, in this respect, quite *au fait*. Mr. Caird treats this matter at considerable length in his reply, but more clearly, concisely, and satisfactorily in his book. These words of mine from the Schopenhauer article I suppose to state the whole case: —

"Schopenhauer, even making the prodigious blunder he did, was never so far left to himself as to conceive the cognition of succession, as succession, only possible to Kant on presupposition of causality. Following *on* was to him as much *sui generis* as following *from*. \* \* \* It is in reference to the unity of the universe, and the correlation of all its parts, Mr. Caird thinks, that there is justification for Kant's (never made) assertion that objectivity results from the category of causality alone."

The reader has now before him many extracts which clearly and fully bear out the above words (where, of course, as already shown, "objectivity" means objectivity of succession). Mr. Caird does hold, not only for Kant, but apparently also for himself, that following *on* is only possible by presupposition of following *from*. "The denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time; sequence is equivalent to causality — sequence implies causality." Mr. Caird, too, does solve the riddle by reference to the unity of the universe. Here, in fact, Mr. Caird, far from turning on Schopenhauer to justify Kant *from* such nonsense, actually turns upon him to justify Kant *for* such grand truth! Nor can any *lapsus memoriæ* be gently pleaded here, for the sole consideration is of "Schopenhauer's objection." Sequence, Mr. Caird thinks, always "implies" more than it "expresses" — "causality," namely; and the result is that cryptic unity of the universe which, as a doctrine, is Mr. Caird's own — his freehold, his *peculiar* — where he, and he alone, possesses all the *droits de seigneur*.

Of course, it could be argued that a mind unprovided with the category of causality could not be a mind at all, and that, consequently, such category must, in every case, be postulated; but I think consciousness of a simple succession of states quite conceivable, without any causal reference whatever. It is this latter reference, indeed, that is not presupposed by, but, on the contrary, presupposes the

former. And so, as yet, it has been taken by everybody except Mr. Caird. Kant himself expressly says (87) that, even were causality unapplied, "impressions would nothing the less present objects to our perception" (which, even alone, is enough!).

Again, it may be argued, let the actual consciousness or experience be what it may, causality is always at least *potentially* present. So much, so put, must certainly be admitted. The concrete unity and community of the universe, the presence at all times of every one of its powers, and in continuity with the rest—that cannot be denied. Emerson, in those Delphic droplets of song of his, tells us this a thousand times: "All are needed by each one, nothing is fair or good alone." Even such contraries as sense and understanding are, to Kant's mind, but twin stems from a common root. Milton, too, was of the same opinion before Kant; "discourse," the angel tells Adam, "is ofttest yours, the latter [intuition, perception] most is ours, differing but in degree, of kind the same." Still, distinction is distinction, even in the concrete; water is not sand, and neither is following on following from.

Further, it would be a simple proceeding to tell us that causality *does* act in determination of sequence in time. We should be as little likely to deny that, as that Kant writes in German. But that really is the question with which Mr. Caird's reply opens! "1. Does Kant assert that the category of causality is involved in the determination of objective sequence?" He might as well have asked, Can a duck swim? Of course, the category of causality acts in determination of objective sequence. One would like to know what else we could put it to. But that, "simply as it stands," is not the question. The question is this, Does causality alone determine cognition of objective sequence? Rather, indeed, this question itself has now become, so to speak, a shade deeper, and runs thus: Does cognition of sequence at all presuppose causality? "Kant argues," says Mr. Caird, "that the judgment of sequence cannot be made except on presupposition of the judgment of causality. The judgment of sequence implies the judgment of causality." So, namely, I took the question, and so I take it. I interpolate no shade of meaning peculiar to myself; it is Mr. Caird's *meaning* I mean to meet, and Mr. Caird's meaning alone. And my conclusion now, is my conclusion then. Such doctrine, taken independently, is untrue. Such doctrine, as referred to Kant, is untrue. Such doctrine, in view of his own expressions, is hardly true for Mr. Caird himself.

The doctrine, independently taken, is untrue. The cognition of the *post hoc* is, in point of fact, independent of the cognition of the

*propter hoc*; and not only so, but the former even precedes and conditions the latter. In a word, casual succession is as much a fact cognized in time as causal succession.; as such, indeed, it is familiar to everybody, and referred to in books an infinitude of times. Tenterden steeple was followed by Goodwyn Sands. The sacrifice of Iphigenia was followed, as is the whistling of the sailors nowadays, by wind. The small-pox in Norway was followed by the disappearance of all the fish on its coasts. Lightning is followed by thunder; the fall of the mercury by a storm; and burst shoe-ties by divorces. The threat of Columbus was followed by the eclipse. The ebb is followed by the flood; inspiration by expiration; and the right leg by the left in walking. A red flag is followed by the stopping of an engine. Tear follows tear, as one drop of rain another. Lamp follows lamp in the twilight; and systole, diastole. The tick of the watch is followed by the movement of the minute-hand; and the fall of the time-ball precedes the shock of the time-gun. One squib follows another in fire-works, and one man drops after another in battle. Boys in pea-scuffles or stone-scuffles get blow after blow. Minister succeeds minister in the pulpit, actor actor on the stage, and player player at the wickets. Carriage succeeds carriage in the drive, and horse horse on the ride. Look out of window, a puff of smoke, a cry of soles, a wagon, some men, a school, furniture on a cart, dust ahoy, sunshine, shadow, rain; such units all duly follow each other. Ideas of Napoleon, Cæsar, Alexander, Wine, France, Spain, Beauty, Esquimaux, Negroes, the Cape, Afghanistan, Russia, Mr. Gladstone, the Earl of Beaconsfield, follow one another in my mind, and are sequences in time. In fact, according to modern wisdom, all my ideas follow one another in time; not at all by the law of causality, but, principally, rather by the mere law of contiguity (Mr. Caird should reflect on that). Alexander Aphrodisiensis says: "Is it not clear that the proposition is false, that all that follows something has its cause in the same, or all that precedes something is its cause? For experience shows us, in the case of things which follow one another, that the latter are not always due to the earlier. It is not night because it was previously day; nor winter because it was previously summer; nor are the Isthmian games because the Olympic games were." *De Fato* (34), we find it said, *Itaque non sic causa intelligi debet ut, quod cuique antecedit, id ei causa sit*; and from this it is clear that to Cicero, at all events, there were not only causal sequences, but casual ones as well. But in such things it is, as usual, Aristotle that is followed. *Meta.*, 994, a, 221, it is said: "One thing follows another in two ways, — either as this after that,

the Olympic games after the Isthmian; or genetically, as the man from the boy." The former mere chronological succession, remarks Schwegler, in his relative comment, "belongs not properly here at all, and is not again mentioned; we must believe, then, that Aristotle names this *τρόπος* only to dismiss it." Elsewhere in Aristotle, however (1023, b. 5), we have, as further instances of non-causal sequence in time, night after day, storm after calm, ships at sea after the equinoxes, and the Dionysia after the Thargelia. In short, the independence of *post hoc* on *propter hoc* exists in nature, and is universally accepted by all mankind in such shape as it occurs in Hume: "An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause." Do not Aristotle, and all other logicians, indeed, flatly forbid us, under pain of committing a sophism, to reason from the *post* to the *propter*? And, as regards the allegation that the former rather precedes and conditions the latter, are not these last two references enough? Hume and the logicians both refer to the two successions in such terms that we see the one, as general, must simply precede the other as specific. It can add but the last touch to the nail here, that even Schopenhauer, whom Mr. Caird follows in so much, will not countenance any such doctrine as the necessary presupposition of *propter* to *post*, but loudly reprobates in Kant (though, of course, by mistake) the denial of casual and the affirmation of only causal succession. Who, of all mankind but Mr. Caird, could for a moment suppose that the very judgment, the very cognition, the very "experience" of *post hoc*, would be impossible to us without the presupposition of *propter hoc*? Knowledge of casual succession is impossible without knowledge of causal succession, and it is not the latter that follows the former! Of course, all that is no prejudice to the fact that all change implies causality; but, surely, it is not that commonplace which Mr. Caird would *discover* in Kant! I acknowledge to feel the circumstances such that, in their regard, I can believe or conceive almost anything; but surely, surely, I am not called upon to believe or conceive that the mysterious, deep-reaching, all-pervading, absolutely original new truth (p. 455) — "the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time" — amounts to no more than that!

But, in the second place here, there is no such doctrine as this in Kant. Casual sequence in time is allowed by him quite its own right in time — casual sequence in time is quite as much allowed its right in time as causal sequence itself. Experience of casuality in time, judgment of casuality in time, cognition of casuality in time, is allowed by him to be by so much less dependent on the experience,

judgment, cognition of causality in time, as this latter must, in all cases, be at least preceded, and so far conditioned, by that former. This much, indeed, is only credible in the very terms of it.

Even suppose we had no direct comparison of the two successions, casual and causal, in Kant, as we have such comparison in Aristotle, Cicero, Alexander, Hume, and others, it would not follow that Kant was not even as they in the general reference. It is wholly with the necessary that Kant has to do. The casual or contingent, we may say, he is never called upon directly to deal with, because, as such, it is insusceptible of rule or order; so that we might reasonably suppose Kant, like Aristotle, to dismiss the subject as not belonging to the sphere of his operations. But it is not necessary to suppose or say that. The very fact that his one object is to introduce a system of necessity—that is, of necessary order, necessary succession—proves indisputably that he admits or assumes, as his very basis, a given and granted and understood element of contingency—that is, of casual order, casual succession. His whole work, indeed, is nothing but the epigenesis—the introduction of necessary succession into the foregoing, plain and manifest, never supposed deniable, contingent succession (not, however, by causality alone). In fact, every object is to Kant, in the first instance, as mere *Erscheinung*, mere crude sense-presentation (and Kant calls *Erscheinung* not a simple presentation alone, but even such compound presentation as the phenomena in any case of causality, say that of the ship)—every such presentation, I say, whether simple or compound, is always a *Mannigfaltiges*—that is, a succession. “In the synthesis of crude presentations,” he says (II., 168), “the many or multiple of the impressions is *always* a following of the one the other”—that is, on the part of the various units of impression, and that is a succession, a sequence. In very truth, Kant assumes twelve contingent successions, and the same number of categories, consequently, to introduce into the former *necessary order*. What quantity subsumes is series in time, like part succeeding like part in pure contingency of sequence till the category acts. What quality subsumes is succession in the filling of time, quite similarly regarded. What substance subsumes is a vicissitude of accidents, and such vicissitude is surely contingency in terms. What causality subsumes are a first and second, which to me are always necessary, but which to Kant are only contingent till subsumption has taken place. What reciprocity subsumes are an exchangeable first and second; and these, too, though already in necessary order to me, are, in the first instance, only contingent to Kant. Then the postulates! They are

three in number, and if they assume one succession as necessary, they take it for granted that one is only possible, and the other only actual. Surely, these last examples are enough. You would not say that a succession that is only actual (Kant's actual *propter*) is necessary, and still less that what is only possible is necessary? Even in pure perception, Kant assumes the succession there to be only contingent; the succession of the moments of time is to him no more than a succession, and, as he says again and again, a succession without causal connection. In fact, it is precisely in causality that there is least succession. Kant, to Schopenhauer's misunderstanding, even takes pains to demonstrate the presence of succession in sundry cases of causality. Are not these cases, indeed, very much examples of two things at one and the same time? Sun and stone, fire and room, capillary tube and fluid, bullet and cushion, frost and ice, are all things together. The whole contention is at once disproved by the fact of series being admitted not only to be irreversible, but reversible as well. At least these two successions are; and what is reversible can never be causal. Of course, all together are a whole; and causality is certainly one of the most indispensable of categories, but it is not the only one. Neither is its irreversible succession the only one. In fact, reversible succession is quite as much a need as irreversible succession; and, as said, the former rather precedes and conditions the latter. Fancy causality alone to produce objective sequence, as Mr. Caird desires; then there would be irreversible series only, and the world cramped into a single potence, a single potential ganglion, an illimitable intussusception, the power of a quantity, whose index were infinitude. If quite direct evidence is wanted as regards the state of Kant's mind, have we not an actual example, at the hands of Kant, of objective sequence produced, not only without the action of causality, but absolutely in special opposition to the action of causality. He opposes the house, objectified by quantity, as well to ice as the ship, both of which exemplify, and are meant to exemplify, causality alone. To pass to quite another region, too—can we not see that, when he speaks of external design, he has before him a variety of events which, following on each other, are yet without the slightest conjunction causally. But we shall see more of Kant's mind, in this connection, when we come to examine Mr. Caird's doctrine of unity—that extraordinary doctrine of a *gediegene Einheit*, a hard integration of all things, through the iron veins of causality—which has been more than once referred to.

We have alluded to certain expressions of Mr. Caird's own, that

seem to render such doctrine as the dependence of sequence *qua* sequence upon causality, hardly true for himself. These are to be found where the words "reversible" and "irreversible" occur. If Mr. Caird admits that there are two sorts of succession, so different the one from the other, so opposed the one to the other, as these words are, then it is plain that they cannot be both causal. To admit a reversible series at all, in fact, is to destroy his doctrine. A reversible series can never be causal. And here we stand by the one spot which alone, perhaps, is sufficient to bring to the whole Kantian system ruin. Did not sense itself, namely, offer material irreversible sequences, the category of cause and effect would be null and void; it would never be called into play at all; for it is only on reception of an irreversible first and second that the logical function of antecedent and consequent will consent to act — will, on plea of *analogy*, consent to receive such first and second into its own necessary nexus. But, allow once an irreversible series in sense, and you allow also a necessity in sense — a necessity already in consciousness, consequently — which necessity, as independent of any artificial, intellectual epigenesis whatsoever, renders all such epigenesis, and by consequence Kant's whole system, a supererogatory superfetation merely. But, let alone Kant, surely we have here a very trying light to Mr. Caird. He is in the very midst of all these *reversibles* and *irreversibles*, and yet remains blind to what they involve, not only for Kant, but even for himself! He is quite explicit on this, for example, that to Kant there are sequences quite as well reversible as irreversible — that is, that there *are* sequences in regard to which causality has no application whatever — and yet, in the teeth of this, his own admission, he declares that the judgment, cognition, experience of sequence as sequence, is impossible without previous judgment, cognition, experience of sequence causal, and that this is the doctrine of Kant! How is it possible to attribute any such doctrine to Kant, at the very moment that one is canvassing statements of his in regard to a reversible sequence which Kant himself declares *cannot* be causal? This, certainly, seems somewhat of a dilemma; but it will occur to us how Mr. Caird got out of it, if we recollect that the reversible series (the house) was to Kant, in Mr. Caird's belief, only subjective, and it was not, therefore, necessarily a contradiction that he (Kant) should still regard the causal sequence as alone objective. More than that, indeed; Mr. Caird was at express pains, with the assistance (unacknowledged) of Schopenhauer's "eye," to make the house itself dependent on causality, and only objective so! Nevertheless, even as to that, it is to be remarked that, let the expe-



dient of the eye be as ingenious as it might, it left the sequence of the house, as the sequence of the house, quite untouched. The eye might rove from roof to cellar, or from cellar to roof, but that was the concern of the eye only. The coalition of myriads of stone parts and stone particles, or brick parts and brick particles, into the actual stone tenement, or the actual brick tenement, was quite independent of the eye. The eye had to take all that simply as it found it; it had nothing to do with the putting of it together. What a futile thing, after all, then, was either the ingenuity at first hand of Schopenhauer, or even the second-hand ingenuity of Mr. Caird! Kant, evidently, knew his own business a little better than either the one or the other of them knew it for him. He agglutinated the particles of the house into the house by the category of quantity, or it was by this category that he made it objective. But this amounts to a contradiction on Kant's part of Mr. Caird's ascription to him of the proposition that reversible sequence presupposes irreversible sequence; he actually objectifies the former quite apart from, and in actual independence of, the latter. Kant, in fact, in full possession of his own doctrine, would have only wondered, had he seen Messrs. Schopenhauer and Caird, in their self-imposed need to find an irreversible sequence for the house — which otherwise, poor thing, would, all too plainly, as they thought, be left subjective—superfluously paining themselves to distort or contort their own organs of vision, as if thus *they* could agglutinate into objectivity the house itself. That they both felt such need, very delicately, but irresistibly, proves, to say it again, that to both there was for Kant but one category of objectivity, while to both, at the same time, the others in that reference were simply unthought of. Both — there cannot be a doubt of it — went together so far, and then they parted, Schopenhauer to object to Kant that there were objective *non-causal* sequences quite as well as objective causal ones, and Mr. Caird to justify Kant, and assert that even sequence, as sequence, implied causality.

We assume the true doctrine, then, to be this (as illustrated from Aristotle, Cicero, Hume, etc.): that, though all change implies causality, yet that the judgment, cognition, experience of succession as succession, sequence as sequence, is quite independent of, and in nowise conditioned by, the judgment, cognition, experience of succession or sequence causal. Mr. Caird himself seems not unaware that this is the state of the case *as vulgarly understood*. He admits that it is *said*, "There are many phenomena which are determined as successive, and which yet we do not conceive to be related as causes and effects;" but then he explains that "when they are so related,

we often do not know it ;” and what is said, therefore, is “not to the point !” When we do know it, he intimates, we find it causal. When one is arrested by such utterances as these, one almost thinks that, after all, what Mr. Caird has to tell us out of Kant is just the commonplace already signalized. But are we to understand that said commonplace, admitted by all mankind, instead of being simply the one thing to be explained, is, not the starting question, but the concluding result of the whole Kantian toil? Every change has a cause. There — that is the relieving breath — that is what Kant ends with — that is his answer to Hume? I suppose it will be “not to the point” to hint that, Why we believe every change to have a cause? was what Hume asked, and that Kant assumed to *answer the why*, and not merely to *repeat the fact*? Mr. Caird’s own words are these: “It is, therefore, a perfectly accurate account of Kant’s position to say that he met Hume’s reduction of the *propter hoc* to the *post hoc* by showing that no mind is capable of the cognition *post hoc* which is not already capable of the cognition *propter hoc*.” To Mr. Caird, this — so assured is he — is a perfectly accurate account of Kant’s position relatively to Hume; and the truth is, that perhaps anything more wide has, up to the present moment, never yet been said in print. Hume’s action was *not* reduction of *propter hoc* to *post hoc*. We have just seen a quotation which admitted succession *propter hoc* to be other than succession *post hoc*, and propositions to the same effect may be found *passim* in the authority concerned. Hume referred cognition of the difference between *propter* and *post* to instinct naturally, and to custom philosophico-explanatorily. Hume’s whole question, in fact, was of the difference. He acknowledged our belief in the necessary connection of cause and effect, but could see no origin for this belief unless, as said, in instinct naturally and custom philosophically. If any one else, however, could show him *another* origin, he was quite willing, he affirmed, to abandon his whole contention. Kant, now, brought forward a whole system of intellectual epigenesis, as this *other* origin which Hume desiderated. Here, then, surely, to say the one reduced *propter* into *post*, and the other answered him by counter-reduction of *post* into *propter*, is, if incorrect in the one proposition, absolutely wild in the other. Kant’s enormous categorical system — the *whole* of which is his reply to Hume — shall be demonstration of the impossibility of the judgment, cognition, experience *post hoc* itself, unless there be “already” judgment, cognition, experience of *propter hoc*. One hopes that that would have proved as satisfactory to Hume as it does to Mr. Caird. Cannot one imagine David Hume benevolently smiling here — hope-

lessly puzzled. The *post hoc* never troubled me, he thinks to himself, only the *propter hoc*; and now I am expected to find myself, not at all only all the more troubled when told that even the easy *post hoc* is really the unintelligible *propter hoc*, but actually in absolute light at last just from that alleged fact! There is no difficulty in understanding *propter hoc*, for — *post hoc* is *propter hoc*! Well, to be sure, that is an *explanation*; and it is the one mighty result of the one mighty Kantian labor! Why do we know that every change has a cause? We know that every change has a cause, because we know that one thing succeeds another *only because* we know that every change has a cause!

As we have here Kant's answer to Hume before us, we may remark, in passing, that Mr. Caird has said the same thing, with a certain modification, in his book. "We cannot, like Hume, set succession against causality; for so soon as we 'bring to conceptions,' or, in other words, to clear consciousness, the synthesis by which two events are determined in time in relation to each other, we see that it contains or involves the category of causality." Hume, for his part, never "set succession against causality;" he only asked, as we have just seen: Is there any origin for the idea of necessary connection attributed to cause and effect, except custom? But, so soon as we "clearly conceive" the synthesis of cause and effect, we "*see*" that it is the synthesis of cause and effect. One hopes that Hume would have contented himself with that also!

In presence of such things, the belief is almost irresistible, then, that Mr. Caird's reason for his, apparently, so very peculiar doctrine on succession is just the commonplace that every change has a cause. But, are we to suppose that no more is meant by such profound *propos* as, "sequence is equivalent to causality," "the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time" — are we to suppose that no more is meant by such profound *propos* than the one proposition with which we, not all end, but, on the contrary, all only begin, *no change without a cause*?!

This leads us directly up to that iron unity of Mr. Caird's. Having seen, namely, what could be said in resistance to Mr. Caird's second proposition, on the ground that such doctrine is untrue in a general reference, untrue in Kant's, and, viewing certain expressions, hardly true in Mr. Caird's own, we have still to recognize fixture on Mr. Caird's part in this, his second proposition, that sequence implies causality; and, without objecting Mr. Caird's emphatic denial of this identical proposition under another face, we have now to consider it

in connection with that idea of a cryptic unity in Kant which we have so often alluded to as dominating Mr. Caird. This we shall follow, first, in his book; and, second, in his reply.

I have no doubt it was not inconvenient to "pass over" certain criticisms as "almost verbal;" and the criticisms being left, I can hardly have much to object to Mr. Caird's passing over them. I have said, nevertheless, and in relation to my notice of Mr. Caird's doctrines, that, "while resolved there should be no mistake as to the state of my mind, I confined myself, on the general merits, to mere indication." Now, that "indication" is what Mr. Caird passes over, as "almost verbal." It was meant, however, as more than verbal — it was meant to indicate, indeed, almost under the one word, *trans-mentation*, what I found the work, on the whole. I began, for example, though never leaving the one eleventh chapter (almost in its first half only), *which specially considered causality*, by pointing out an essentially radical and absolutely crucial mistake in regard to the distinction between the mathematical and dynamical categories. Now, it is in aid of his peculiar unity that Mr. Caird restricts the former to imagination, and places existence under the latter. I should say, however, that Kant, for his part, gives no precedence to the one categorical class over the other, even in reference to existence. Nay, if Kant gives, in that reference, precedence to either of them, it is certainly to those categories which, for Mr. Caird, are evidently only subjective and confined to the imagination. These latter, for example, are actually named *axioms and anticipations of perception*, while the others are but *analogies or postulates of relation*, absolutely null till the former have found *objects* for them. Kant (140 — 1) expressly tells us that, while the mathematical categories are "out and out necessary," the dynamical ones, on the contrary, are "in themselves only contingent." While the former are "apodictic," he adds, the latter are only "mediate and indirect," not possessing the "immediate evidence which is the special property of the others." The former, further, are "intuitive," the latter only "discursive;" the former (154) "constitutive," the latter only "regulative." What all that amounts to, in regard to relative *existential actuality* of knowledge, every student of Kant at once knows. Surely, what is constitutive must be much more palpably an ingredient of existence than what is only regulative — what concerns an actual object, as perceivable, have much more the form of existence in it than a mere relation, which has to wait for its objects. Such considerations as these, however, seem to have wholly escaped Mr. Caird; he thinks what

here is constitutive ~~has~~ to do only with imagination, while what is merely regulative has to do with actual existence. Why, imagination itself, for that part, belongs quite as much to the dynamical as to the mathematical categories. Both sets are in apprehension, and the vehicle of apprehension is, to Kant, imagination. Coleridge, in reference to Kant's peculiar traffic with imagination, held that faculty to be "the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I Am!" That is *transelementation*. When we do not understand plain prose as it is there before us, it loosens under our eyes into so many Ossianic vapors of dream. That was Coleridge, however it be with Mr. Caird. "The idea of Kant," says Mr. Caird, "that imagination limits knowledge, will be considered at the end of the chapter;" and, "at the same time, we have to remember the danger that accompanies this gift" — ha! But I have said enough now to indicate a mist that wonderfully extends itself without — the slightest occasion. I should never end, if I took up every spot that I see. What it concerns us to know here is that Mr. Caird, for that unity of his, cannot refer to any superiority, so far as Kant is concerned, in the one set of categories over the other, at the same time that a guiding light is thrown, perhaps, on what, to Mr. Caird, is merely "verbal." We consider at present only that idea of unity by means of which Mr. Caird would prove, on Kant's part, identification of sequence, as such, with sequence causal, and would impose on causality some altogether supernatural or transelemental function of unity in reference to *every moment of time*, and, I suppose, point of space. Of course, no such thing exists in Kant, and it has a wonderful effect on one's mind to be asked to look at it. We quote from said eleventh chapter a few of the most salient sentences that bear on it: —

"Kant argues that the judgment of sequence cannot be made, except on the presupposition of the judgment of *causality*. For time is a mere form of the relation of things, and cannot be perceived by itself. Only when we have connected events with each other, can we think of them as in time. And this connection must be such that the different elements of the manifold of the events are determined in relation to each other, in the same way as the different moments in time are determined in relation to each other. But it is obvious that the moments of time are so determined in relation to each other that we can only put them into one order — *i.e.*, that we can proceed from the previous to the subsequent moment, but not *vice versa*. Now, if objects or events cannot be dated in relation to time, but only in relation to each other, it follows that they cannot be represented as in time at all unless their manifold is combined in a synthesis which has an irreversible order; or, in other words, unless they are so related, according to a universal rule, that when one thing is posited, something else must necessarily be posited in consequence. In every representation of events as in time, this presupposition

is implied; and the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time. \* \* \* We cannot, like Hume, set succession against causality, for so soon as we 'bring to conceptions' (p. 77; Tr., p. 63), or, in other words, to clear consciousness, the synthesis by which two events are determined in time in relation to each other, we see that it contains or involves the category of causality. For the relation of one moment to another is such, that the apprehension of one moment is the condition of the apprehension of the next; and, therefore, in attributing succession to things, we are already attributing to them necessary sequence."

Preliminarily to explain: In regard to what is meant by the phrase, objective sequence in time, I may seem to have applied it to units of impression only, and it may possibly have occurred, in objection, that matters might be different if we applied it, not to sequences of units, but to sequences of the objects which these units compose. The sequence of units that takes place in the formation of objects may be one thing, and the sequence of these objects in each other's regard, once they are formed, quite another. It is to be said at once, however, that neither Kant nor Mr. Caird has made the distinction. The sequence of the units in the case of the house is taken for granted to run parallel with the sequence of objects in the case of a ship varying place on a stream, or of ice following water upon frost. As with units, indeed, so with objects. Some are causal, and some casual, or otherwise varied. Nor is the implication of causality in change one whit stronger for the one series than for the other. Mr. Caird's words in the above quotations reflect this indifference. We there see that "events," "objects," "things," are all openly put upon precisely the same level. In short, to Mr. Caird causality is the minister of objectivity to successions, whether implicit or explicit, and it is no matter which.

Mr. Caird's own words give his reader little difficulty as to what he holds of succession generally, and we again refer to them in confirmation of our own relative statements. In fact, the moment we consider that these words are addressed — at least the latter of them — to the objection of Schopenhauer, their import becomes unmistakable. Schopenhauer, as in the case of the "tile," objects that there are sequences casual as well as sequences causal, or, to use Mr. Caird's words, that "sequence is *not* equivalent to causality." Mr. Caird, consequently, can only oppose that by asserting Kant to regard succession as but another word for causality. But it is with Mr. Caird's reasoning in support that we have at present to do. Nearly his first sentence maintains that "only when we have connected events with each other, can we think of them as in time." Now, if there *are* successions casual, that cannot be so; we can very well think

of objects and events in time, and see objects and events in time, without connecting them the one with the other at all. And that at once negates Mr. Caird's next step, the "dating" of objects in time, the identification of each object with its own moment in time, so that objects must succeed each other in the same irreversible succession in which time itself flows on. I have already shown (in first, unpublished, part of this essay) that, *let Kant's words seem what they may*, there is no such doctrine as this in Kant. Mr. Caird holds it to be impossible for objects or events "to be represented as in time at all, unless their manifold is combined in a synthesis which has an irreversible order." It is true that no succession can be represented in time as an *event*, unless its manifold is *of itself* in necessary order; but any succession, reversible or irreversible, or otherwise as it may, can, simply as it stands there, be represented in time. Was Kant's house incapable of being represented in time, then; and what of series that are reciprocal, A B C D's that are quite as much D C B A's? However it might be with time, it was quite evident to Kant that things themselves were not always in the same kind of succession in time. To Mr. Caird, however, it seems that "objects" "cannot be represented as in time at all, unless their manifold is combined in a synthesis which has an irreversible order!" — "the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time!"

"So soon as we 'bring to conceptions' (p. 77; Tr., p. 63), or, in other words, to clear consciousness, the synthesis by which two events are determined in time in relation to each other, we see that it contains or involves the category of causality." In one way, that is saying nothing, for as much lies in the very word *event*; so soon as we see event, we see causality. But what is meant must be, that to "bring to conceptions," or, what is the same thing, "clear consciousness," *any* synthesis, is to see that it involves causality. That is proved by the words *from* which the above sentence follows with a "for." "We cannot, like Hume, set succession against causality, for so soon," etc. That plainly means that succession is equivalent to causality, and that we see this the moment we "bring it to conceptions," or, what is the same thing, to "clear consciousness."

Suppose now, here, we turn up Mr. Caird's reference. In Kant (I have not the translation) it runs thus: "To bring this synthesis to notions, that is a function which pertains to the understanding, and whereby it first procures us cognition (perception) in proper signification." Now what is this synthesis? It is the "synthesis of the imagination," which, as we have seen, and may further see in a

thousand places else, means, in the first instance, no more than the initial blur of sense-impression in time and space. That initial blur, that mere raw material of special sensation, is then, in the second instance, presented to the categories (the functions of self-consciousness), to be by them objectified. That is what "bringing to conceptions" means — simply categorizing as such — "not," says Kant (169), "the making the perception of objects *clear*, but the making the perception of an object at all *possible*." The categories are the "conceptions" (properly, notions) meant; and, consequently, to "bring to conceptions" is to offer any mere blur of subjective sensation to the categories, not to do what we mean by bringing things to "clear consciousness!" The result, then, is a completed object of perception; not that that result is due only to the category of causality, but possibly to another, or others, of the twelve. Kant himself, in the case of the house, gives us an example of this process, in which, as he expressly demonstrates, there is no reference to causality at all. It is only under the delusion of causality being alone the minister of objectivity that both Schopenhauer and Mr. Caird think themselves under a necessity to rescue the unlucky house from the subjectivity Kant inflicted on it, by vindicating (in his despite) causality for it, through the brilliant, but utterly inapplicable, device of the twist of the eye. One sees how very intimate Mr. Caird must be with the machinery of Kant, when that whole vast machinery — applied to make (what Hume desiderated) an objective external world intelligible, in its necessary connection, out of a mere subjective blur — was to him only a bringing of things to "clear consciousness!" But the concluding words of the passages quoted are equally wide. For, that "the apprehension of one moment is the condition of the apprehension of the next," is not, in any way the slightest, a reason for regarding the attribution of succession to things as identical with the attribution to them of necessary sequence; reversible (reciprocal) or irreversible, all successions are alike in time. Yet, to Mr. Caird, one moment in time being condition to the next, "*therefore*" succession at all is necessary sequence, and necessary sequence is due to causality. Such things, Mr. Caird tells us, shall have been the doctrine of Kant. I think it must be evident to every reader who considers our quotations only, that, so far as the atypical, inapplicable, and objectionable is concerned, they are quite inexhaustible. Nor, in the same reference, will it strike the same reader less with wonder that Mr. Caird, having all that in his book, should still think it possible to him to say that he had been — misrepresented! Suppose we offer Mr. Caird here to apply



to him a crucial test. Mr. Caird, accused of regarding causality as the only minister of objectivity, and just minded to vindicate precisely as much as that for Kant, loudly denies it all the same, and maintains that he holds a like doctrine for *all* the categories. Does Mr. Caird, then, still think it necessary, for the objectivity of the house, to take the loan of Schopenhauer's eye, or will he now be content, like Kant himself, with the category of quantity? One moment of time, indeed, conditioning the next, so that all succession in time is irreversible, how yet could succession in the house be possibly reversible to Mr. Caird? But we turn now from that, his book, to this, his reply.

When, after analysis of, and due familiarity with, Kant, one considers his own short statements of his own proceedings, and the penetrating and comprehensive light they at once throw into the very prose of these, one looks back with wonder on the strange, foreign-looking, unintelligible monstrosities that must have stood for doctrines of Kant before the eyes of expositors of even not so very long ago. De Quincey, for example, in his article in *Tait's Magazine*, for June, 1836 — what uncouth strangeness, under the name of Kant, looks out to us from such writing as that! We feel spoken to in whispers, and we hold our breaths for awe. Coleridge gazes on the simple fact of consciousness as in presence of the unspeakable I Am. Mr. Buckle, sublime in self-complacency as above all in knowledge, but understanding not one single word of what he says, talks, with the characteristic puff, of that "wonderful thinker" who, working out "the difference between the transcendental operations of the reason and the empirical operations of the understanding," had, by this difference, "solved the problem of free-will and necessity." It is pleasant to think that, even as early as 1827, Thomas Carlyle could be a conspicuous exception to such mere vamping of ignorance and pretension. In his article on "German Literature" he has occasion to say a word or two on Kant. But each is as unpretending as, within the limits acknowledged, it is solid. It is now full half a century since that article appeared, but even yet, in England, the common knowledge of Kant is about as vague, shadowy, and unreal as it was in the days of the Coleridges and De Quinceys. Kant himself talks (II., 561) of a country "where the ground (*instabilis tellus, innabilis unda*) permits one neither to stand nor swim, but only to stumble a hasty step or two, of which time preserves not the slightest trace;" and surely these words, written in Germany a hundred years ago, are largely true still of the *Critical* regions, as they loom even now in the eyes of most Englishmen. These are regions that have yet to us all

the strangeness, uncertainty, even dream, about them of some new-found land. There the dragon still watches the golden fleece, and there are brazen-hoofed, brazen-horned bulls, that vomit fire. The mouth of the Euxine is still guarded by the terrific shears of the fell Symplegades. History has not yet cleared and fixed itself in prose, but wanders mythically, mistily, over an unstable soil. Almost no one even yet speaks here, but his words are as convulsed, and sound as from the bosom of nightmare.

And yet, what has there not been done meanwhile to preclude all that—not in one country only, but in several! In what short synopses, easy to see through (as already referred to), does not Kant himself—to leave out others—a thousand times repeat himself! I have said that he who “possesses” any subject “sees all at a glance, and can tell all *in one word or a thousand*,” and Kant himself is a most felicitous example of this. In his various works, from his “Kritik of Pure Reason” in 1781, and his earlier essay in 1770, down through his Prolegomena, his Practical Kritik, his Judgment Kritik, his Progress of Metaphysics since Leibnitz and Wolf, his Concerning Philosophy in General, his Streit der Facultäten, his Anthropologie, etc., to his Logic (published) in 1800, we have specimens, again and again, both of the one word and the thousand. Perhaps as short a statement as any in Kant is the phrase (II., 674) that the whole materials of his work proper consist in “Space, Time, and the Elementary Notions of the Understanding.” But that, again, in one word, is his “Epigenesis.” We have only to bear in mind, in these references, that to Kant, so far as any perception of objects is concerned, we are only shut into our own internal affections, our own subjective sensations, which are thus, substantially, *never* entities without—we have only to bear this in mind intelligently to see, further, time and space, as phenomenal dimensions, sinking into and separating affection, while the categories, as functions of synthesis, follow, to unite all again into a *quasi*-external system. That is the whole of Kant. That is the assumed necessary epigenesis on the assumed subjectivity of all that we feel or perceive. In fact, the whole of Kant is contained in the single phrase, “the possibility of experience”—*under such conditions*, namely, as he thinks himself *necessitated to presuppose*. We are surrounded by an external universe. The question then is, necessarily, to Kant, how are we to conceive such *show* thrown up or out? Evidently, under such conditions, one must always, like the mole, work within. Time could only be within—a spectrum, so to speak, only of length within, along which affection necessarily

extended itself. Space, also, could only be within — a spectrum still, but this time a stereoscopic spectrum, as it were, in which affection could only stereoscopically diffuse itself as so much nebula. Now, what could make of this nebula, so situated, an object and objects? What, but an element that was also within? What, but (all that is still left us) the functions of the understanding, consequently, which could only, by aid of the movement of imagination, unite all manies or multiples of the sense-nebula in time and space into the single ego, and so convert it, the nebula, so constituted and so placed, into the formed world around us? Kant, as I say, feeling himself so limited by assumed conditions of which he never doubted, gives, himself, such scheme, in some such brief terms, a thousand times. In fact, he significantly tells us, from Persius, *Tecum habita, et noris, quam sit tibi curta supellex!* Obligated to live within ourselves, we had better take stock within, and see how small our house-furniture is. Always we are to conceive that, shut into ourselves, “the conditions of the possibility of experience,” on that understanding, are “the conditions as well of the possibility of objects.” We are always to find, consequently, these conditions in (1) the internal prius of affection (sensation), as affection; (2) in its (affection’s) two formal or pure perceptive spectra of space and time; (3) in the collocating and conjoining movement of imagination (memory); (4) in the functions of the understanding, that variously combine multiples or manies of sense-perception, as multiples or manies of sense-perception, into (5) the unity of consciousness. Things in themselves are postulated as conditions (somehow) of the affection that is set up in our sense, we know not how, but it is this affection alone that is known. The postulated things in themselves are, for their part, never known; they have indeed, anywhere in this our world, no existence. The affections themselves, as alone in consciousness, are alone what, by said internal machinery, is constructed into objects, accepted as external, and accepted, so far as independent, in a system — the context of actual experience. Of all this there is, on Kant’s part, only thousand-fold speech. “I must briefly point out,” says Mr. Caird, “the general bearing of Kant’s Criticism of Pure Reason.” It will prove *belehrend* to compare with such summaries from Kant, Mr. Caird’s “summary” that follows; for it is here that, in justification of what to us is his second proposition, Mr. Caird directly approaches (in his reply) that peculiar unity of his: —

“Kant’s view of experience may be summarized thus: In the *Æsthetic* he shows that inner and outer perception, involving as they do determinations of time and place, are possible only through the pure perception of time and space.

For he argues, a moment in time and a place in space can be represented by us only in relation to other times and other places, and, therefore, in relation to the unity of time and space as individual wholes. We cannot perceive any object of experience, as here and now present to us, except by relating it to one all-embracing space and one all-embracing time."

This, we are to understand, is what Kant has to tell us in his *Æsthetic*; I can hardly realize a word of it. All that Kant has to tell us in the *Æsthetic* is that time and space are not, as we suppose, independent outer entities, but mere potential spectra within us, which, on hint of special sense, so to speak, expand to receive it. His arguments, again, are (what bears on mathematics apart) only these: (1) time and space, though *involved* in every act of special sense, are not contributions of special sense; and, (2) time and space are nevertheless not notions, but perceptions. That is the whole of the *Æsthetic*, and I can hardly find more than an echo of any part of it in Mr. Caird's summary. Mr. Caird puts the entire stress on *unity* — the unity of an all-embracing space, and the unity of an all-embracing time. Kant sets no store by their unity; his whole object is accomplished when time and space are acknowledged to be universal subjective forms of sense. Where Mr. Caird gets his unity, however, it is not difficult to discover; he has simply misunderstood the German equivalents of the following words: —

"Space is not a discursive, or, as we say, general notion of relations of things, but, on the contrary, a pure perception. For, firstly, we can conceive only a one space, and when we speak of a plurality of spaces, we understand thereby only parts of one and the same sole space. These parts, likewise, cannot be *before* the one all-embracing space, as if constituents rendering its composition possible; they can only be thought as in it. It is essentially one; the complex of parts in it, and consequently, also, the general notion of spaces, rest solely on limitations."

Time is described almost in the same words, but still with shades of difference that throw light — as, "different times are only parts of just the same time, but the consciousness which can be given only by a one object is perception;" "the fact that different times are not at the same time, is inderivable from a general notion — it is directly implied in the perception of time;" "where the parts and every magnitude of an object are conceivably determined only by limitations, there the whole is one of direct perception, and not of notions, for, in the case of a notion, its parts *are before it* is." These last words plainly mean that individual mammals — cats, dogs, men, etc., which go to make up the general notion of the genus *mammal* — must existentially *precede* that notion itself. They afford a gloss, then, that would explain the previous phrase, "constituents rendering composition possible," not chemically or physically, but

logically or metaphysically. With that light we might paraphrase Kant's description of space thus: Space is not an actual object of special sense, but, as it were, an optical mirage of general sense; no notion, but a perception, its parts being in it or only limitations of itself, and not sub-notions, like individuals under a species. We might add, indeed, did we accept the chemical or physical interpretation: Space is evidently no object of special sense, but a spectrum or mirage, as it were, optically thrown; for its parts are all given with it, and do not precede it to make it up, as acid and base to make up a salt, or brick and mortar to make up a house. Take it as we may, it will be difficult for any one not to realize now Kant's ideas of space and time, and Mr. Caird's relative misinterpretation.

What Kant "argues" is, that there is no special perception of anything whatever that does not *involve* time and space as already "to the fore," as it were; and yet they are not contributions of special sense. He has not a word of argument about "a moment in time and a place in space being able to be represented by us only in relation to other times and other places, and, therefore, in relation to the unity of time and space as individual wholes." Neither is there any more a Kantian sense in what follows. There is no such doctrine in Kant as, that "we cannot perceive any object of experience as here and now present to us, except by relating it to one all-embracing space and one all-embracing time." Kant says we never do perceive any object without perception of time and space as well, which, being no contributions of special sense, and yet always involved, must be, so to speak, spectra, mirages, of general sense. He is quite contented that they should be taken so, and has no idea of *nailing* things in definite moments and places of either. In arguing that time and space are still perceptions, and not notions, he has to show that they are, like all objects of perception, wholes, unities, whose parts are only limitations of themselves. Kant's unity of time (or space) is its elemental unity as perceptive object. It is that argument for mere perceptivity, as against conceptivity, which Mr. Caird, probably, has so marvellously transelemented.

"Kant," Mr. Caird proceeds, "finds himself obliged to prove that the former determination of things, which was demonstrated in the *Æsthetic*, is not possible except through the latter, which is discussed in the *Analytic*." Here, again, it is hardly possible for a man to speak more widely of the very plain thing that is before his eyes. There was *no* determination of "things" in the *Æsthetic*. That may be boldly said with absolute truth. And still less is there in the *Æsthetic* a determination of things, which is not possible

except through the determination of things in the *Analytic*. The *Æsthetic* has nothing to do with determining "things" at all. It has only to prove that time and space are subjective forms, and not independent realities. Once you grant that, Kant is contented; and his time and space, any further, *are simply as yours*; his *Æsthetic* has done its work, then, and that was the whole of it. Nor has anything in the *Analytic* the slightest tendency to alter that. The *Analytic* has only to show that, time and space being such forms, the categories objectify in them the subjective affections of the special senses. The categories concern quantitative series in time, qualitative filling in time, relative order in time, and relative validity in regard to time; but they have nothing to do with determining to "definite places or times," so far as that determining is conceived to be a "dating." The categories have really nothing whatever to do with time, but only with what is in time. They connect in time, so to speak, without thinking of time—in the same way in which ropes, and bolts, and bars, and hooks, and chains, and nails, might connect objects in so much water, without reference to the water. Nay, the categories do less than that. It is as though the objects in the water were all already connected in their own way, and the categories only struck government stamps upon the various *media* of connection, ropes, bolts, bars, etc. All actual quantities, all actual qualities, all actual things in relation, are in time and space quite of themselves; for time and space are forms attached to general sense, and no particular sense can act without bringing them also into play. But all that is quite independent of the categories, which have positively nothing to do but *enhance* the authority of the connections already in force; and that too, without making any call whatever upon time, as time. Mr. Caird seems to think the categories nail things to their definitely appointed places in time and space, but it is only the things themselves do that—it is only sensation does that; the categories only *retouch* the order of things as already existent in its own way in time. Mr. Caird expressly has it, however, that "while we cannot represent an object as existing, or an event as occurring, except in space and time, we cannot determine either to a definite place or time except through the categories, and especially through the Analogies of Experience." These latter, as shown, have no advantage over the other categories, and none of them have anything to do with *definite* places or *definite* times; that is left wholly to the empirical element. What have the categories got to do with Cæsar's death, on the 15th of March, 44 B. C., at the base of Pompey's statue, in the Senate-house? "Nothing can be known," says Mr. Caird, "as

existing or occurring at a definite place or time, unless it be also determined as standing to other objects and events in those definite relations expressed by the analogies of experience." Why should Mr. Caird be at pains to point out such commonplace as that? Nothing *is* known, or *can* be known, that is not in definite relations in definite space and definite time. But, surely, we are not to regard that as a discovery of Kant, or a work of his categories — surely, we are not called upon to admire his wisdom, or their power, for laying down, or effecting, that for us! This comes of the false dogmatic attitude of Mr. Caird to the transcendental operations of Kant. Mr. Caird does not understand Kant's word *transcendental*, and quite as little his phrase, "the possibility of experience." Mr. Caird thinks the *phrase* applies to a demonstration of the conditions of an absolute experience, and that that is what transcendental means. But the phrase means, what conditions can possibly *explain* this experience of ours on the supposition, never for a moment to be doubted, that all that can *materially* be known are contingent subjective sensations within? The word *transcendental*, again, is used of all those *à priori* formal elements by which, in that they epigenetically come upon these sensations, and infuse into them a new force, Kant proposes to advance the required conditions explanatory of our experience under such presuppositions. These, however, are not Mr. Caird's ideas. Kant's proposals are not to him tentative, but dogmatic; and he is constantly bringing forward the commonest commonplaces of the commonest experience as discoveries, results, of that profoundest and most recondite, absolute philosophy. "Inner and outer perception, involving, as they do, determinations of time and place, are possible only through the pure perception of time and space." "A moment in time and a place in space can be represented by us only in relation to other times and other places." "No one thing or event can be known as objectively existing, or occurring, except in so far as it is definitely related to other things and events." "We cannot represent an object as existing, or an event as occurring, except in space and time." "Every object *must* exist in a definite part of the one space; and every event *must* occur at a definite moment of the one time." I think we knew quite well, before Kant, or his categories, that objects and events were necessarily in space and time. Surely, it has been commonly understood all along that a thing must be in one place; it cannot well be in two places at once. But Mr. Caird is ever thus, coming out dogmatically with the commonest things of experience as *results* — marvellous results — while at best they could only be *tests* for Kant's extravagant hypotheses, of perception

being confined only to our own affections, of time and space being but expansible discs within us, etc., etc. Mr. Caird seems ever to have wholly lost sight of Kant's mere hypothetical stand-point, or at least to have converted it into a dogmatic one. "Kant," he says, "has an expedient of his own, which he frequently uses; he asks what would become of the unity of experience if the truth of these principles were denied." That is not so; that is dogmatic, and Kant never asks anything in that way. Kant's principle is certainly the possibility of experience, and he asks again and again how could there be a ruled and regulated context of experience unless so and so *were*. But then that is never done absolutely, but only relatively. *If* we know only our own internal affections which are contingent merely, how *can* that contingent subjective affection show to us as a context of experience — as necessary objective perception — unless on the supposition that such and such epigenesis from the functions of self-consciousness descends upon it, or enters into it? That is what the possibility of experience means to Kant, and what he proposes is only hypothetical and tentative on the ground of certain undoubted presuppositions. "Kant says that time and space cannot be perceived in themselves, but only through the relation of objects and events in time and space; and that no object or event is capable of being determined directly in relation to time and space, but only indirectly through its determination by the categories in relation to other objects and events." The same errors are rampant there also. Mr. Caird mistakes what Kant means by not perceiving time and space themselves. When Kant says that, he means that they are not absolute objects, which, being perceived, would by their own nature dictate this and that; he is only speaking in allusion to his own theory that, being mere forms of general sense, they are not perceived by themselves, but only when special sense, acting, brings them, too, into act. But, once brought before consciousness, they are for Kant quite as they are for us. Potential subjective discs they may be, but they are for all that precisely the same time and the same space that we know; and Kant does not impose conditions on them, but, on the contrary, simply accepts the conditions of their peculiar nature, just as everybody else must. Evidently, then, that being so, it cannot be true that for Kant "no object or event is capable of being determined directly in relation to time and space." On the contrary, all actual objects and all actual events, let the categories *varnish* them as they may (and the categories only *varnish*), are and can be only "*directly*" determined in their "separate," "definite" places, and their "separate," "definite" times. But it is impossible to follow all Mr. Caird's



particulars; we pass on to his conclusion in the reference that is before us.

Objects and events, as we have seen, must to Mr. Caird be "dated" in time; they must actually, and in very fact, be "determined to a definite moment of objective time." So it is that to Mr. Caird there is a *one* both in time and space. So assured, indeed, is Mr. Caird of this that he asks, airily, "Is it necessary to quote Kant for this?" and answers as airily, "If so, take one passage where many are ready." What Mr. Caird quotes is a passage from Bohn's translation, and I have to say at once that, let Mr. Caird take what doctrine he may from the translation, it is impossible to find any such in the original. Let the reader have the goodness to contrast the following translation (having previously verified it) with what Mr. Caird quotes in his reply at p. 218 of the JOURNAL:—

"That something happens, is a perception, belonging to a possible experience which becomes actual when I regard the sensuous presentation with reference to place, as determined in time, consequently as an object which can always be found in the context of perceptions according to a rule. This rule, however, to determine something according to sequence in time is, that in what precedes, the condition is to be found, under which the event always (*i.e.*, necessarily) follows. And therefore the proposition of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience, namely, of the objective cognition of sensuous presentations, as regards the relation of these, in sequential series of time."

I think no Kantian student will make the comparison requested without seeing where the shoe pinches—without seeing something of the source of the strange delusion that, in a Kantian reference, possesses Mr. Caird. The reader may recollect that Schopenhauer was shown (in my former article) to have referred expressions of Kant, which concerned causal successions only, to successions general. The same thing has happened here. The passage is quoted from the second analogy, where Kant is dominated by consideration of only one form of sequence in sensation, that which claims the category of cause and effect. Mr. Caird ought to have borne that in mind. Here, however, are the words to which he has pinned his faith, and been, thereby, widely misled in regard to the teaching of Kant: "Actual experience" is "what is fixed to a definite point of time;" an object of such experience may "by the aid of a rule," be even always "found;" and so it is that causality is "the principle by which alone we can have objective knowledge of phenomena in regard to their sequence in time." One of the strangest things in Mr. Caird, to the student of Kant, is his extraordinary doctrine (already seen) on time and space. These, far from being mere subjective mirages, are

brought by him before us as though they were actual *boards*, into which events, like so many nails, had been immovably hammered fast. When one reads what Mr. Caird quotes, however, one wonders no longer. There, too, things are fixed to definite points in time, and causality is alone the objective principle in regard to sequence in time. Nevertheless both of these things are gross delusions, and neither the one nor the other ever crossed the brain of Kant even in a dream. Bearing in mind that there is no reference but that to the manifold or multiple which applies in causality, the meaning of the clause about the definite point of time is, when something *happens* (is of the nature of an occurrence), what is, so far, only sensuous presentation, gets objectified when its place becomes determined *relatively* in time. That refers only to the *relation* of causality: whenever something is, something else always ensues; *that* being given, *this* is given. And it does not matter in the least whether it is given in the time of Cæsar or in the time of Napoleon, in the Athens of Pericles or in the London of Wellington. Kant has not a moment's thought of time as time, and of definite points to which, being actually nailed, events can always be found if we apply a certain rule! Neither has Kant here, when he says "sufficient reason is the ground of the objective cognition of sensuous presentations relatively in sequential series," any thought of causality being the only agent of objective sequence. Sequential series means that the presentation is such as is required for action of the category of causality—it is sequential, and the rest of the phrase means only that the category has objectified the members of the series *relatively*. Not a very breath of the thought of any multiple but that one multiple that must necessarily present itself before the category of causality can act, has ever crossed here the mirror of Kant's mind. By that "rule," does Kant mean a chronological table! It is only, then, by an extraordinary perversion of Kant that these extraordinary decisions as regards either fixed time or universal category of objectivity have been won. And yet, at the very moment that Mr. Caird perpetrates this perversion (he had Kant's own words before him, and the translation is no excuse, but, on the contrary, an exaggeration of his offence), he exclaims, "How Dr. Stirling can find in my words anything like the assertion that objectivity results from the category of causality alone, I am unable to discover!" I have shown that the word "objectivity" stands in my pages, in Mr. Caird's reference, only once singly; that wherever else it occurs, and it occurs again and again in every sentence which either precedes or follows, it is coupled with the word "sequence" or "succession;" and that, where it

stands, and as it stands, only *intention* could discover it to stand for aught else than objectivity of sequence. Mr. Caird's sentence, also, that *immediately precedes* his declaration of being unable to *discover* how Dr. Stirling can find in his words anything like the assertion that objectivity (of sequence) results from the category of causality alone, is this: "But what I contend is that, on Kant's own principles, it is not possible to determine any series, whether of perceptions or external events, as an objective or real succession, except through the category of causality." Mr. Caird's words, again, that *immediately follow the word "discover,"* are, "the passage in question is concerned only with objective *sequence!*" I meet this just so: I assert that the statement of Kant's doctrine in regard to objective sequence is a greater blunder in Mr. Caird than even in Schopenhauer; and I assert, moreover, that all these words are but a shuffle; for what is said of objective sequences, can also be said of objects. That I have shown to be the doctrine not only of Kant, but precisely, and accurately, and literally, of Mr. Caird as well. Mr. Caird, then, here, is unable to discover how Dr. Stirling could find in his words anything like such and such an assertion — Mr. Caird says this at the very moment that he admits this to have been certainly said by him of "objective *sequence*" — at the very moment that he knows that my word "objectivity" stands there, and can stand there, only for objectivity of sequence — at the very moment that he knows that all objects, even as objects, are nothing but such sequences! This is very gross — it is doubly gross, and more than doubly gross when coupled with the wilful alteration of my language in order to found an accusation of "entire" misrepresentation — and it is beyond all measure gross when it is considered that what is indignantly denied and angrily branded as entire misrepresentation, is the very proposition that, with a touching moral emphasis, is immediately to be — *justified!* My interest, however, concerns, and concerns only, the interests of Kant, and to them I address myself.

This strange delusion about fixed and definite moments in time follows Mr. Caird everywhere, and is of such importance that I must be pardoned for dwelling on it. I have said that Mr. Caird has failed to perceive that he has again only erred like Schopenhauer; he has given a general reference to what concerned the peculiar sense-multiple that is to be found in cases of causality alone. The paragraph quoted by Mr. Caird, indeed, immediately precedes that which concerns Schopenhauer in the same reference. It will be useful to refer to Kant's reasoning (168–171) in connection with both. The follow-

ing paragraph, literally translated, contains the whole relative doctrine (and I shall consider here five consecutive paragraphs, of which that cited by Mr. Caird is the third): —

“In the synthesis of sense-presentations, the units of impression always follow one another. So far, no object is perceived; the succession is still indifferent, and such succession is common to all apprehension. When, however, I perceive or assume that there is in the suite nexus of one state with another from which the former follows according to a rule, then I have before me an occurrence, a happening, an event. That is, I perceive an object which I must set in time in a certain definite position, which, by virtue of what state precedes, cannot be otherwise assigned to it. When, therefore, I perceive that something happens, then, there is implied in this, first, that something precedes, for just in connection with such something the presentation gets its relation in time — gets to exist, namely, after a time in which it was not. But its definite time-place in this relation it can only get by this, that, in the preceding state, something is presupposed, on which it always (*i.e.*, according to a rule) follows. Whence it results that, first, I cannot invert the series and set what happens before what it follows from; second, that, the precedent state being given, this certain event infallibly and necessarily follows. Thereby it happens that there takes place between our perceptions an order in which the present state (so far as it is a *become* state) refers to some preceding one or other, as a correlate (indeterminate as yet) of this given occurrence, which indeterminate correlate, however, refers itself determinately to the other as its consequent, and connects it necessarily with itself in the time-series.”

This paragraph is followed by one of those which seem most strongly to rule that the succession of time, as such succession, is a constituent in the causal judgment. Notwithstanding such an expression, however, as “preceding time necessarily determines succeeding time,” we have seen reason to decide that Kant never had the succession of time, as such, in his mind, but only the succession of things in time — and of things, too, as he is careful to point out in parenthesis, so far as they were things (not merely passing), but “become.” We saw then, too, that it was an error on the part of Mr. Caird to rule that “we can connect events as *in* time, only in so far as we relate them to each other *in the same way that the moments of time are related*,” etc., etc. The moments of time are related, to Kant, as he expressly tells us, in mere indifferent succession, absolutely without hint of the succession causal. Mr. Caird says, also, “objects are perceived as in space only when they are related to each other as the parts of space are related;” and thus, in the same way, gives space itself a constituent place in reciprocity. That, also, is a mistake as regards Kant; and it is specially in place to mention the one and the other here, as they largely go to confirm Mr. Caird in that board-like nailing of events and objects, so that they are to *be found when wanted* in time and space!

In the next paragraph there again occur words which appear very strongly to refer to said doctrine of fixed points in time. "The perception of an object in general," Kant seems to say, "only takes place in this way: that the understanding transfers the time-order to the presentations and their existence, in that it assigns to each of these, as consequent, a place in respect to the preceding presentations, *à priori* determined in time, without which place it would not coincide with time itself, which *à priori* determines for all its parts their positions." These words, nevertheless, however strongly they seem to make time itself an ingredient in the very virtue of causality, have no relation whatever to that virtue. They say only this: that events, as necessarily only perceivable in time, must be necessarily only so perceivable; but not the slightest addition is made to the peculiar force or virtue of causality by any relation of part of time to part of time. By the paragraph translated, the due light will be found to be thrown here, and indeed the following sentence in the paragraph before us gives focus to what we have just seen: "This determination of the positions, now, cannot be borrowed from the relation of the presentations towards absolute time (for that is no object of perception), but inversely, the presentations must themselves determine for one another their places in time, and make these in time-order necessary." That is, appearing in time, they obey the succession of time; but on the rule of their places, as in the order of that succession, the constitution of time itself has no effect.

The next paragraph is the one quoted by Mr. Caird from Bohn's translation, and as it alone is crucially decisive, it is of the last importance that it should be thoroughly understood. Now, the term "actual" is capable of suggesting another light, that I wish to illustrate. "Actual," as we have already seen, is formally defined by Kant, "what coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation)." Here, however (context and modifying words being left out of consideration), it *appears* to be said that a perception becomes actual when its place is determined in time, and can always be found in the context of experience according to a rule. And it is thus that Mr. Caird has taken it. He says (450): "To determine any object or event as actual is, according to Kant, to give it a definite place in the context of one experience, or, what is the same thing, to determine it in one space and one time in relation to all other objects and events." Mr. Caird, evidently, has forgotten "actual" as specially defined, and has given it a meaning from this passage in the second analogy. The words, as I *paraphrase* them above, and still more as they appear in the translation used by Mr. Caird, present

certainly no inconsiderable resemblance to those of Mr. Caird. Nevertheless, Mr. Caird has still given them such extension and turn of phrase as prove him to have altogether misinterpreted the German. Here the word "actual" is not Kant's "actual" proper; it has taken on such shade of meaning as makes it equivalent to *objective*. Mr. Caird says, "to determine any object or event as actual;" but he has no authority for the word *object*. The "perception" Kant has in his eye, as is only in place under the second analogy, is not an "object," but only a "happening," occurrence as occurrence, event as event. In fact, it is not the perception, but the experience, that becomes actual; and this experience becomes "objectively actual" when the subjective sensuous facts assume in each other's regard a fixed time-relation in such manner that "event" (happening, occurrence) presupposes its precedent determining condition. Kant has no *Erscheinung* before his mind but that of cause and effect; he has not objects before his mind; he has before his mind only the phenomena of event as event, the process "happening." To "determine in time" means for Kant, here, to determine two things *relatively to each other* in time, and that quite generally, with reference to causal connection, or with reference to such general rule of "order in time." He has not the shadow of a thought of "dating" in time.

It will prove illustrative to bring in now the following paragraph, the last that is to be referred to here. It is the one in which Schopenhauer is shown to have made a mistake of meaning; and the statement it contains is, to quote from my article, to the effect that, "in the first instance, the order in a sensational multiple is indifferent, but that, in the second instance, when received into the *à priori* machinery, it is necessary. Otherwise, says Kant, there would be a mere sport of my own subjective fancies, and any assumption of objectivity would be no better than a dream," etc., — Kant's "general conception is simply this: Sensations only exhibit subjectivity; accordingly, as required, the categories — all the categories — shall bestow on them objectivity. Schopenhauer has actually read that passage of Kant as if it declared all objectivity to be bestowed by the single category of causality alone — a blunder that, surely, would be astounding in even a first year's student of Kant. In the particular paragraph, Kant, of course, has no thought but of causality and of causal multiples; he has not the most distant conception of enunciating it as a general rule for all sense-multiples that they can get objectivity only from causality." In fact, the whole paragraph is unmistakable, and even light-giving — light-giving, not only as

regards Schopenhauer, but in Mr. Caird's reference as well. For what mistake Schopenhauer made, that same mistake, here also, Mr. Caird has made. Both the one and the other ought to have reflected that there was nothing in Kant's mind but that peculiar multiple or manifold, that peculiar complexion of sense-consciousness that was called event; and that he was not talking of objects generally, and not even of events as events. He was not confining objectivity only to causal sequences, and he had no idea of the definite places of objects or events in time, but only of the consecution in time of that general thing called event. That general thing called event constituted the "perception," the "experience," actually named.

In short, as said, in the paragraph on which Mr. Caird builds, Kant has not the shadow of a thought of "dating" in time. This word *dating* occurs again and again in Mr. Caird, and he really means it. "We cannot perceive any object of experience, *as here and now present to us*, except by relating it to one all-embracing space and one all-embracing time;" "no one thing or event can be known as objectively existing or occurring, except in so far as it is definitely related by means of the categories to other things and events, and therefore to the unity of experience as one all-embracing whole;" "nothing can be *known* as existing or occurring *at a definite place or time*, unless it be also determined as standing to other objects or events in those definite relations expressed by the analogies of experience;" "determined to a definite moment in objective time;" "in *dating* it in short, we *ipso facto*, assume it to be necessarily determined;" "to *date* it thus in objective time would be impossible except to a mind that connects phenomena as cause and effect." These passages are all from the reply; and they confirm the quotations already made from the book, where general doctrine and particular term (*dating*) repeatedly occur. What is meant by "determining as actual," as having "a definite place in the context of one experience," as determined "in one space and one time in relation to all other objects and events," if, for a moment equivocal in those forms, which surely it is not, must be admitted to be sun-clear when we hear that "every object *must* exist in a definite part of the one space, and every event *must* occur at a definite moment of the one time;" where, however, it strikes us that this "one" of experience, time, space, etc., is only a perversion of that repeated "one consciousness" of Kant, which is conceived by him to be the collapse to objective unity in any case of a categorized manifold of impression. Nay, Mr. Caird having asked, "Now, on what does this *empirical* consciousness of the world as one system of objects and events depend?" actually replies, "Kant

answers that it depends on the application of the three schematized categories of substance, causality, and reciprocity," "without which there could be no *empirical* consciousness of the world as an objective unity in space and time;" and at p. 458 he begins an express and formal exposition of the necessity of such principles for "development" "clearing-up," etc., though he admits that "even our first unscientific view of the world contains already the idea of its unity, and of the correlation of all its parts." The doctrine plainly is that Kant regards even the *empirical* dating of objects and events in time as dependent on causality with some aid from substance and reciprocity! Of course what is empirical must for Kant appear only in the succession of time and the succession of space, and it is then, further, *curdled* by the categories, as it were, into objective singles and objective singles in connections of rule. But all that is quite general to Kant; he has not the slightest idea of that definite empirical dating which Mr. Caird ascribes to him. This, it may be, has been sufficiently explained, as well as the false translation on which it rests sufficiently demonstrated; but it may, perhaps, with advantage, be still further enforced.

The whole matter lies in this, that by determining in time, Kant only means relative determination of any *become* state in time, generally and indefinitely; while Mr. Caird represents him to mean positive determination of things and events in objective time definitely and particularly, each special thing or event, that is, being conceived to be in its own special actual moment of time — a mistake, than which no other possible mistake in regard to Kant could be more absolute or more fatal. The only complete demonstration of this would be a translation and explanation of all that concerns the *analogies*, which of course is impossible here; but we may add a quotation or two to what precedes. Kant expressly says (153), for example, that what is concerned is only the time-relation; there is a necessity for every impression to undergo "synthetic unity relatively in time;" manifolds are to be "relatively united," "a synthetic unity, *à priori* determined," accrues to "all perceptions relatively in time." "Objective consecution of sense-presentations" is said (165) to "consist in the order of the manifold of impression, according to which order the apprehension of that which happens follows on that of the other which precedes according to a rule;" where manifestly the *order* is what is concerned. Three pages further we are told that "our impressions (in causal cases) get objectivity only by the necessity of their order in the time-relation;" and Mr. Caird's "certain definite place in time" can only be a perversion from that of a term in reference to its cor-



relate in a *general relation* to the actual *date* of an empirical event in time.

The moment our sensations are objectified, they have all their own relative positions in time and place; and though as sensations they are contingent, they have all taken on, in themselves, in their order, in their relation to us, a certain *varnish* of necessity from the intellectual functions represented by the axioms, anticipations, analogies, and postulates. But there is nothing in the categories that nails them to certain points in space and moments in time, and all together to an iron unity, in which any member can at any time be found by a rule. That is a mere caricature of the ideas of Kant. It is not at all the business of causality, or any other category, to tell the sensations where they shall be either in time or space—even mutually, though *varnishing* them once they are there. That depends, wholly and absolutely, on the sensations themselves. In one way, the categories are concerned, not at all with time and space (which, by the by, rather disunite than unite), but with groups of sensation already in time and space. Once the sense-blur in time and space is presented, through imagination, to the categories (the functions of intellect), these objectify them; but they by no means direct how or where the objects shall be in time and space. Where this table, or that window, or that falling shadow shall be in time and space does not depend upon the categories, causality or other, but upon the empirical succession itself. How an object shall be related in space, and where it shall be related in space, and so of time, is wholly conditioned by the sensation itself that determines that object, and not by the categories. It is only a further error to say “especially by the categories of relation;” for, as already shown, these categories have not the virtue in them that the mathematical categories have. Kant starts with the inadmissible assumption, against which Reid directs himself, that we perceive, not things without, but ideas within, and he never quits it. That assumption is radically determinative with Kant from first to last. There is nowhere in Kant an idea of an absolute experience—of experience *as* experience—that consequently determines, on absolute reason, how this world shall be. What guides him always is “the possibility of an experience” *on* such and such assumptions. So it is that when he comes to reason itself, as reason, it has no constitutive precepts whatever for us, but only two or three subjective precepts (about a God, etc.) which, as convenient for arrangement, had better be adopted. It is to be feared that others, too, are as Mr. Caird, and look to Kant, as master of an absolute philosophy, to tell us at last what the soul is! That is particu-

larly delicious. Kant and Hume are the boys to tell us what the soul is!

One would think that the illustration of the house ought to have kept Mr. Caird relatively right. A house is an object. Mr. Caird is aware that Kant has objectified it by the category of quantity, and has opposed it to objects — ice and ship — categorized by causality. Yet, like Schopenhauer, he is quite sure that the succession constitutive of the house is to Kant only subjective. How, then, could Mr. Caird believe that, in that instance, Kant had connected this actual object into definite points of space or definite moments of time? That would be impossible if it remained subjective, and Mr. Caird held Kant, so far as Kant went, to regard the house as subjective. Is it not touching, in such circumstances, that Mr. Caird should take pity on the house, should not leave it out in the cold, but should, through Schopenhauer's trick of the eye, all-inapplicable as it was, do for the house what Kant, evidently, had only for the moment "forgotten?" Kant, more evidently, for all that, had not forgotten anything; he had objectified the house by the category of quantity, and never dreamed that it was necessary to apply causality also, in order that it might be definitely placed in space, and definitely "dated" in time. Such placing or dating, indeed, as has been so often said, never occurred to Kant, even in a dream. All this does not alter the fact, however, that, there being no forgetfulness on the part of Kant, then, in Mr. Caird's eyes, any actual house, though actually in the world, could not be referred by Kant to the "systematic unity of experience" at all.

I sleep in a strange room, and I see in the morning a sun-spot dance on the ceiling, where one would not expect a ray of the sun ever to fall. By and by, I find that the sun-spot is a reflection from a basin of water in the window, on which the sun shines and the wind blows. So far as time is concerned, both sun-spot and water are co-existent. Nevertheless, I have no hesitation in objectifying a connection between the two through the category of causality. But that is all. I do not, through causality, or any category, nail the sun-spot to the ceiling, and the water to the window of No. 72 in the Green Posts, Exmouth, at half-past seven o'clock of the morning of 7th of June, 1863. But it is that, if language is to convey meaning at all, which Mr. Caird's words would have me do. I am, by my categories, so to nail sun-spot into time and space that it may at any moment actually be found — through a rule! One wonders, in such circumstances, of what good the categories are, or of what good Kant himself is. We know that, empirically, every man has his own father and

mother, his own moment of birth, his own point of space at birth — that not a mote in the sun but has its own space and its own time — but what then? Did we need the categories or Kant to tell us that? or is it the categories that do that? Why, after all, this original, mythic, or cryptic unity of Mr. Caird is but the common, prosaic, every-day unity to which we are all present, without a dream of philosophy; and we all know well that, in place where and date when, all is independent of us, let us categorize into quantities, qualities, and relations as we may. It is really surprising the things Mr. Caird attributes to Kant's machinery. "We cannot represent an object as existing, or an event as occurring, except in space and time." It is only a transcendental philosophy that could make us aware of that grand truth. "Every object *must* exist in a definite part of the one space, and every event *must* occur at a definite moment of the one time." The prodigious discovery of Kant, that a thing is where it is! Surely, it was with some such philosophy in his eye that Carlyle exclaimed, "With all my heart, but where is it?" Yet, is it not truly admirable with what simplicity and stolidity of conviction Mr. Caird, though supported only on misinterpretation and mistranslation, pleads for this philosophy? Whatever he may be when he manufactures the two propositions and complains of misinterpretation, he is sincere here. Justice has not been done him in that, his own feat, beyond Schopenhauer — the discovery that succession as succession is, through causality, *dated* into unity in time and space. He, for his part, only laments that the theory is, in Kant's hands, not complete enough — that he (Kant) neglected that correlation of the various categories of relation which he himself has "suggested elsewhere!"

When one sees Mr. Caird's success with Kant, one wonders what part in it ought to be attributed, not only to "Kant's immediate successors, especially Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Jacobi, Maimon, and Schopenhauer," to whom he "owes most," but also as well to the numerous Drs. Bona Meyer, Cohen, Arnoldt, Hölder, Paulsen, Liebmann, Grapengiesser, Von Hartmann, Thiele, "and others," whom he only mentions, as to the innumerable "special obligation," to which it is "all but impossible" to do more than refer. Of all, the result this — transcendental this — the deduction of the categories this — the answer to Hume this — necessary connection in experience simply must be *because* it must be!

The truth is, however, that Mr. Caird has not understood Kant, but simply perverted and travestied him. What Kant offers is a provisional proposal on certain understandings, but of this Mr. Caird makes a philosophy that is absolute dogmatism. If the reader will

please to turn back to the passage which Mr. Caird quotes from himself as "summing up the results of Kant's discussion of the principles of the pure understanding," he will there find Kant represented as bringing his principles to culmination in a general idea of nature as a system of substances whose quantum of reality always remains the same; which idea of nature is nothing if not dogmatic. Yet, Mr. Caird actually says: "The proof of this idea of nature is not dogmatic, but transcendental — *i.e.*, it is proved that without it there could exist for us no nature and no experience at all." We have already remarked on the misunderstanding here of the import of the word "transcendental," and such use of it on the part of Mr. Caird is not restricted to this occasion. In his book he says: "These principles are proved on the transcendental method by showing that without them there could be no empirical consciousness of the world as an objective unity in space and time." Now, it is evident from these quotations that "transcendental" means, to Mr. Caird, a rising above experience, in order to account for it on general principles of reason; but Kant never gave the word such meaning in his own mind. What was *transcendent* was an element to Kant *named* by us in experience, and so, perhaps, to us regulative in experience, but an element that constitutively was never to be got at in experience at all. *Transcendental*, again, was what transcended special sense, but not experience; on the contrary, though *à priori*, it was an essential constitutive element in and of experience itself. Kant had no idea of a transcendental method that raised him above experience, to construe and construct it out of absolute principles. His provisional theory of perception, to account for this latter, in spite of certain necessary and apparently hostile presuppositions which (for him) required to be granted, does not at all answer to what Mr. Caird evidently conceives as the transcendental method. Consultation of III., 57, will easily satisfy any one that Kant's idea of nature was not at all that of Mr. Caird. We there find the empirical element allowed its own vast domain in nature, and transcendental laws of nature restricted to such conditions as make this experience of ours possible *on the supposition that we only know states of our own*.

In fact, the whole passage is a very fair sample of what I call transelementation, in Mr. Caird's view of Kant. The effect of such a passage is to make us see in Kant an absolute philosopher, who has taken his measures so deep that he explains to us the very conditions, substantial and essential, on which existence *can* only be, and, just by reason of the necessity of profoundest insight, *must* be. So to represent Kant is not to understand Kant in the prose and reality

of his own thought, but, in default of such understanding, to impregnate his plainness with visionariness and dream. One feels, everywhere in Mr. Caird's Kant, as if one were reading from those chapters of Washington Irving or Charles Dickens, where forgotten enclosures of defunct mail-coaches have suddenly become once more tumultuous with life. Or again, we are, as it were, in some vast furniture-warehouse, where nothing remains at rest in the prose of actuality, but all has become alive in a strange poetry of nightmare. Arm-chairs rub their knees; tables stand tipsily, like a dog, on a leg or two; wardrobes look stealthily out, and tall fire-stoves fall over in open guffaws, with their hands in their pockets and their caps awry. Mr. Caird exhibits to us Kant's machinery, piece after piece, not as though these were the tentative, and provisional, and *pro re nata* things they are, but as the solid beams and other materials of this absolute universe. Mr. Caird has no germ of reality for the passage I have quoted but the fact that Kant says, you see this or the other piece of mine *fits*. It is a fact, he continues, and you admit it, "That, in all the vicissitude of phenomena, substance endures, and its quantum in nature is neither augmented nor decreased," or, that "all changes take place according to the connection of cause and effect;" now, my machinery in explanation of perception, on the supposition that we are never out of our own subjective affections, fits this. That is all. It is quite a perversion to take Kant, as it were, from the wrong end, and behold him, bit by bit, building up the whole vast universe, apparently, on absolute principles. This universe, in Kant's way of it, is, and is so as we know it; he only wants to make it credible that (despite our knowing only our own affections, as he is undoubtedly, though mistakenly, convinced) yet, that his theory of perception explains how it is that we see these affections as this actual world of external and apparently independent objects. This point of view, which is capital, Mr. Caird altogether misses; at every step he, to coin a verb, transelements Kant, so that one who, perhaps, thinks himself at home in the Kant of Kant, feels always *wunderlich zu Gemüthe* in the Kant of Caird. Nor is this wonder lessened, but, on the contrary, very much increased, when one turns to Kant himself to find out what is it that Mr. Caird is at any time paraphrasing. What astounding contrast, that little bit of everyday prose, and this whole vast mythological universe, which it shall be supposed alone to support and vivify and generate! Quantum in nature remains the same; change implies causality; objects exist and events occur only in time and space; every object must have its own space, and every event its own time — these and other such,

endlessly, why should Mr. Caird mention them ever and anon as results, discoveries? Why should he cumber his thought with so much matter that requires no thought, nor, indeed, any word to be said about it? Why, with that "dating" of his, should he run risk of being held to regard time and space as, after all, things in themselves, into which—into whose very substance—our sensations are actually incorporated?

The truth must be said at last, indeed, and, wrung from me—after silence maintained, after only a word spoken as mere salvo to one's conscience, when silence was longer impossible—*wrung* from me, as I say, by Mr. Caird's *entire misrepresentation*, it is this: Mr. Caird—with a house before him that, determined by quantity, was yet subjective; accordingly, with a house before him which he must make objective by the unacknowledged causality of Schopenhauer's eye; with all those erroneous views in regard to the categories, specially and generally; with what he conceived determining in time to be, what bringing to conceptions, what transcendental, what possible experience, etc., etc., etc.—was, possibly, not in a case to write on Kant's central philosophy at all. Such a system as Kant's can only be pieced together with the labor of many years. No man is strong enough to read it off to us as he goes. Why, on his own showing, Mr. Caird has not even German enough for the indispensable intelligence. As it appears, he is still obliged to trust to translations, which, moreover, he cannot—or at least does not—correct when required, and no man—that is, of course, so far as my own necessarily limited experience may be relied on—no man, who, for a moment, would think of translations in connection with an exposition of Kant, is within years and years of such bare possibility. Accordingly Mr. Caird, at least within the limits specified, has rather dreamed over Kant than seen into him; and what is to him "the philosophy of Kant" were, to my mind, almost more relatively entitled *Kant's Mythology*.<sup>1</sup>

This, within limits, and I have specified them. In other respects the volume may be a very admirable repertory of the most fertile and original philosophical suggestion, and as such it may be met by, and deserve, the absolute worship of many. It cannot be my wish to gainsay that, or to have it otherwise. It can only be my wish that it should *not* be otherwise. At worst, one can hope for it such fate as has attended even harder deep books. One of Hegel's best editors

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<sup>1</sup> A previous remark may be extended to some of the objects of the above strictures. It is just possible that things, everywhere palpably wrong in use, may be correctly enough spoken of at times—*must* be, where reporting another is concerned.

tells us of that *ehrenwerthe Klasse* who were drawn to the master rather by "spontaneous instinct than clear consciousness;" and, I dare say, we have all heard of that admiring, but perplexed pupil who carried up the three volumes of the *Logik* even to the snows of Chimborazo—presumably with the hope of solution there. One knows that there are people in this world who, wholly unable to see meaning in the pathology of Scirrhus, will rise at once to the crab in one's breast that devours daily half a roll. But it is not these that one would hope as readers for Mr. Caird.

One must certainly admit a great courage in Mr. Caird. It was no small matter, with Kant's *house* on his back and only Schopenhauer's *eye* in his head, to keep his feet and hold his own, as well by that bold shout of "verbal," as by that infinitely bolder cry of misrepresentation, misrepresentation, entire misrepresentation, on the credit of a proposition only openly and transparently forged. For the comfort and security of assurance, now, what is the acutest eyesight to solidity and stolidity of nerve? Surely, when one thinks of it all, and when one reads at the end of it all, "I have now answered all the matter of Dr. Stirling's attack upon my views, so far as it seems to me to require any answer"—surely, I say, when one thinks of it all, and at the end of it all reads this, one must admire the trust indicated in the possibilities of brow!

And so I conclude a very plain story of—entire misrepresentation, which, in its length and otherwise, I hope the interests of the study of Kant will excuse.

Mr. Caird's personalities (absolutely gratuitous and crassly pert as they are) I do not notice.

In sum, what Mr. Caird had to meet was his implication in the ignorance of Schopenhauer: of his proceedings in that reference it will be now easy to judge. Further, when it is considered that Mr. Caird—almost glorying in the assertion of objective sequence being due to causality alone—did yet, for all that (weakly substituting "objects"), brand me (who had imputed to him only his own proposition), with the flagrant crime of "entire misrepresentation," every one will readily understand what respect for such small arts remains to me. I shall rely on the sympathy of all my readers, at least to that extent. And, as regards Kant, surely the sympathies of the world will be with him, when it is considered that Mr. Caird has written, and printed, and published, a whole huge volume of seven hundred pages to prove that the single outcome of that enormous labor, the entire relative philosophy, is a fallacy, a sophism—the simple fallacy, the simple sophism of reducing *post hoc* to *propter hoc*!